'Mesopotamia. Commission' [‎19v] (41/256)

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3. The Commission will see that the precis is divided into five parts,
each dealing with a distinct phase of the campaign. The papers in the
Military Department of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. have been arranged on this plan,
and it will therefore considerably facilitate business if, when making
references, the Commission adhere to this arrangement.
Taut 1.—Deals with the genesis of the campaign and the occupation of
Basra, 23rd November 1914.
Part II. —With the consolidation of our position on the Shatt-el-Arab up
to the arrival of General Sir John Nixon and the victory near Shaiba,
14th April 1915.
Part ILL—With the occupation of the Basra Viliyat up to the capture of
Kut-el-Amara, 29th September 1915.
Part IV.—With the advance on Baghdad, battle of Ctesiphon and retreat
to Kut-el-Amara, 4th December 1915.
Part V.—With the operations for the relief of Kut and transfer of
control to the War Office, 16th February 1916.
The above division into five parts is not an arbitrary one, but has been
advisedly adopted by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. . Each period deals with a separate
phase of the campaign. Parts I. and II. cover the period during which
General Sir Arthur Barrett was in command. It is also that for which
Lord Crewe, as Secretary of State, was chiefly responsible. Parts III. and
IV. are those with which Sir John Nixon is primarily concerned as the
General in Command. Part V., which deals with the operations for the
relief of Kut, is that in which Generals Lake and Aylmer were the chief
actors.
4. During the time covered by these papers the main questions for the
consideration of the Commission would seem to be : —
(а) Why did we go to Mesopotamia at all ? (Part I.)
(б) Why did we occupy Kurna and the Karim Valley ? (Part II.)
(c) Why did we go on to Kut-el-Amara and Nasiriyeh ? (Part III.)
(d) Why did we attempt to march on Baghdad? (Part IV.)
(e) Why did we attempt to hold Kut-el-Amara? (Part V.)
(/) Why was no adequate provision in land and river transport, in
medical materiel and personnel, &c., made to meet the strategical
requirements ?
Questions (a) to (c) are those with which I am primarily concerned, while
I am hardly in a position to give useful evidence regarding the details of
(/). If, therefore, I am to be the first witness, and to endeavour to assist
the Commission by my evidence in arriving at iheir conclusions on the
particular points above stated, I respectfully suggest that my evidence
should be taken on them in their due sequence in accordance with the
arrangement of papers in my office, otherwise I fear that my examination
may tend to become both prolonged and discursive.
5. As my evidence will presumably be chiefly concerned with the genesis
of the campaign and its gradual development, it may be useful to the
Commission if I here make a brief statement on this aspect of the inquiry,
more particularly in its initial stage, I therefore ask leave to present a short
account of the same.
As the precis gives in detail the telegrams which passed between the
Secretary of State and the Viceroy, I do not propose to repeat them at
length in this statement, but merely to refer to them or to give their gist so
far as is necessary to elucidate the subject.