Coll 17/16(1) 'Iraq. The Assyrian Crisis' [‎88v] (187/1036)

9
Enclosure 1 in No. 1.
Mr. Edmonds to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.
(Secret.) Bagdad, August 9, 1933 >
Dear Oelvie-Fovto ^ Staftord , s s/291 „ f the 7th August, 1933, which
gives a m™ inleresting P and our first connected, account of the events of the
ith Before Spt of this I had already asked the Minister to forbid the panicky
employment of Kurdish lashkars when the first news of these events reached
the qadhas. Yours sincerely,
Enclosure 2 in No. 1.
Memorandum by the Administrative Inspector, Mosul and Arbil Liwas.
(No. S/291. Secret.) „ t . moo t
IN paragraph 5 of my S/290 of the 5th August, 1933, I gave my opinion
that the French authorities would not commit so definitely an unfriendly act to
the Iraqi Government as to return the arms to the Assyrians. Events have proved
that I was wrong. , ,. . . , ,
On the afternoon of the 4th August the French did give bach the arms. What |
makes this action more blameworthy is that (1) the Iraq Political Officer, in the
course of the meeting with Captain Larist on the 2nd August, paiticulaih
requested that, if it was the intention of the French authorities to return the
rifles thev should first inform the Iraqi authorities. Captain Larist noted this
request in his pocket-book. (2) About 2 p.m. on the afternoon of the 4th August
Lazar Effendi (iMudir of Oohuk), who was acting as Assistant Political Officer,
crossed over to Khaniq, as the French were taking over the police post. He met
a French officer there. This officer said nothing whatever about the return of the
rifles to the Assyrians. It is, of course, possible that the blame for the
extraordinary conduct of the French authorities must be entirely attached to the
local French officers. The superior authorities may have ordered the return of
the rifles and the immediate expulsion of the Assyrians, which orders were
carried out at once by local authorities, who must have known full well what the
result would be. It is, however, common knowledge that the French authorities
would welcome any trouble in the north of Iraq, which might strengthen tneii I
claim for the continuation of their mandate in Syria. In any case, it is quite
obvious that no credence can be given to any statement of the French. Thiswil
have to be remembered when their account is received of what occurred on the
evening of the 4th August. It is certain that this account will be distorted.
2. I have seen Makki Beg, the Political Officer, and Lazar Effendi, the
Acting Political Officer, and from their accounts and from other reports which
have received I have been able to obtain some idea of what happened on e
evening and night of the 4th August. i
Naturally, much still remains obscure, but the following is at least a roug
outline :—
(a) As noted above, Lazar Effendi was in Khaniq police post at 2
he was there Werda, Mukhtar of Simmel village, spoke to h 11 ? f
said that a number of Assyrians wished to return to Iraq.
Effendi told him that they could do so, but would have to return
rifles. Werda said that he understood that. . aJ
(b) At about 5 p.m. the French authorities brought down two lorries o
head of Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Suffan. These lorries were full of Assyrian 1> iiJ es ’ j eave
were given to their owners. The Assyrians were then told to
Syrian territory at once.