Coll 30/111 'British Naval Stations in: Establishments at Khor Quwai and Bahrain. Evacuation of Henjam and Basidu.' [‎567r] (1140/1154)

^ Pr0P p 0 elI°ula‘ he eStaWiShMent ° f a British Naval Base in the Musanciin,
mad^b^SirTewL^leUy, 'then"polilicaf’Pe‘•f first to llave been
1863, is given in the Fo^OfficSo^amo! Gulf - »
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. Gazetteer, Vol. I, pp. 251 to 258 * 19 ° 8 ’ ailC m Lorim er’s
ap,, a ,,d the view that it w« " ih„
issri ^nsraiw f «* k "
thp Arahinn tk ij i ■ ixas Musandim promontory or
the Arabian shore. There would otherwise be risk of our beinn driven bv
nuhtary force from our necessary naval base. Moreover, the only anchorLes
which can be trusted are on the Arabian shore.” y^ncnoiages
67 Almost simultaneously the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. had suggested that
it .night be desirable to choose Ras Musandim as a site for a lighthouse in
preference to Little Quoin, - and the Government of India, in the light of the
expression of the views of the Admiralty quoted above, were prepared to
agree to the substitution “ apart from the considerations arising from the
Anglo-French Declaration of 1862.”t
08. In April 1913 the Government of India reported that the Director,
Royal Indian Marine, saw technical objections to the selection of Musandim
as the site^ for a lighthouse on the grounds that “thick weather over
Musandim is the rule rather than the exception . . . further . . . worst
tides experienced anywhere in the Gulf and its approaches are found round
Musandim Island.
69. In May the Admiralty expressed the view that “ while a naval base
on the Musandim Peninsula would theoretically he in a somewhat better
strategical position for the control of a railway passing along the northern
shore of the entrance to the Gulf, if threatened by a hostile advance from
the north-west, practical considerations point rather for the present to the use of
Henjam . . . with Basidu as a subsidiary base. It does not appear necessary
to contemplate the actual fortification of a naval base in this region so long
as we retain the command of the sea in Eastern waters. ’§ This disposed
of the question of a station on Musandim; and it was agreed that the
lighthouse in contemplation should be erected on Little Quoin as being
preferable from the strictly navigational standpoint.
70. There appear to have been no developments until in Februaiy 1927
the Political Pesidentj] indicated that Khassab was of value, not merely m
connection with the air route, on which it would constitute a jumping o
ground for Gwadur on the Makran coast, but for strategical reasons, since
“the country possessing it can practically command egress from and ingiess
to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .” Sir L. Haworth t ^Tbe esSsCe^
Khassab from Muscat, possibly for about ^ h; practicable
of “a Gibraltar at the head of the Gulf. He ieg*iCMUUS *>V , Hig
vis-d-vis France, in view of the right o ^ ie 6 P f igni'
Majesty’s Government under the Exclusive Agreement o ■
71. No views have been expressed on the subject {j?‘^^ITGoTCm-
India. With the Persian challenge « »<* a fortified
ment m Basidu and Henjam the P° s3 Peninsula or on one of the
. ; . ... statl0 “- IL , h 7rel e Zph Wand and Sheep Island) the
adjoining islands, on two of whicl ( - » 1 . ^ t becomes of more
British fag has for a ehort permd been ^^consideratious apart.
* Tel. from Pol.
Res. to G. of L,
Jan. 3 1913, P. 700.
t Tel. from Viceroy
to S. of S. for L,
Mar. 12 1913, P. 951
X Tel. from Viceroy
to S. of S. for I.,
April 26 1913,
P. 1663,
§ Admiralty to
F.O., May 1 1913,
P. 1733/28.
1| Desp. 1 from Pol
Res. to Gr. of I.,
Feb. 19 1927,
P. 1575.
base, at any rate a
' v. - c t u / I VM I ) 1 I I i ct j.a '-*■ ^ 7 ■~ j: t '
the past, becomes of more
w Xu j ‘gfratefifical considerations apait,
immediate importance. ! lu ^ n , Clc p t Tprnnien t & are free agents vis-d-vis
the extent to u hich His Majesty s Qomume* aie^ ^ formally
France, who, though aware of, is u0 o fl 891 “will call for careful ■’ , ‘
recognised, the Exclusive Agreement of 1891,
tion before a decision can be ta en.
examma-