Miscellaneous papers on the Near and Middle East [‎1r] (1/70)

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.]
Printed for the use of the Cabinet. February 1910.
CONFIDENTIAL.
ARAB QUESTION.
i
Sir E. Grey,
I SUBMIT for the consideration of IBs Majesty’s Government the results of the
informal discussions which have taken place with M. Bicot and after consultation with
the competent Government Departments.
It was found at the outset impossible to discuss the northern limits of the future
Arab State or Arab Confederation unless the French desiderata in Syria, were also
examined, as M. Picot was unable to separate the two questions. I think, however,
that the preamble to the proposals lays down with sufficient precision the fact that the
proposals in regard to the Blue area, as well as to tbe Red area, are contingent on the
fulfilment of certain essential conditions, and give full opportunity to the Allies, and
especially to Russia, to have a voice in the linal settlement of those parts of the whole
problem.
The four towns of Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus will be included in the
Arab State or Confederation, though in the area where the French will have priority of
enterprise, Ac. You will see from Sir H. McMahon s telegram No. BIT of the
20th November, 1915, annexed herewith, that it had been contemplated that this
sphere would be reserved to the development of special french interests.
There is one point which doubtless requires explanation, and that is the reference
to Cyprus. The French consider that in according to us the ports of llaila and Acre
they are giving away “ acquired rights,” which had been granted to them under the
French loan to Turkey of 1914, and that they must have, therefore, an equivalent. It
also appeared during conversation that they leared that the cession of Cyprus to Greece
might be revived on some subsequent occasion, and that Greece might afterwards
transfer the island to Italy. M. Picot, therefore, insisted on some guarantee against
Cyprus being disposed of without the previous knowledge and concurrence of 1 ranee.
It is possible, as M. Picot has been informed, that His Majesty s Government may not
view such an engagement with favour, though M. Picot asserts that his Government
regard this question as an essential condition.
A. N.
Foreign Office, February 2, 1916.
Cairo, November 20,1915.
Sir IT. McMahon to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)
(No. 707.)
(Telegraphic.)
FOLLOWING from Sir M. Sykes for D.M.O., No. 19 :—
“ Your private letter of 5th November just received. Previous to getting it I saw Faruki, and,
anticipating French difficulty, discussed the situation with him with that in view. Following is best
1 could get, but seems to me to meet the situation both w ith regard to France and Grea,t Britain.
Arabs would agree to accept as approximate northern frontier Alexandretta-Aintab-Birijik-l rfa-
Midiat-Zakho-Kowanduz. Arabs would agree to convention with France granting her monopoly of
all concessionary enterprise in Syria and Palestine, Syria being defined as bounded by Euphrates as
far south as Deir Zor, and from there to Deraa and along Hedjaz Railway to Maan.
“ Hedjaz Railway as far south as Amman, could be sold to French concessionnaire. Arabs would
further agree to employment of none but Frenchmen as advisers and European employees in this
area. Noted Arabs will not [? undertake to] employ Europeans if they can do without them, but
Faruki points out this stipulation is to avoid any shadow of control. Arabs would agree to all French
educational establishments having special recognition in this area.
“Arabs would agree to identical convention with Great Britain with regard to remainder of
Greater Arabia, viz., Irak and Jazirah and Northern Mesopotamia. Further, Arabs would agree to any
territory north of Greater Arabian frontier being French possessions under French flag.
“ Arabs would agree to Basra town and all cullivated lands to the south being Briti
agree
“ Arabs would be prepared to make a treaty with Entente Powers-
itish territory
“ 1. Undertaking on their part to have no dealings with Turkey, Germany, or Austria for period
of fifteen years.
“ 2. On the part of Entente Powers to guarantee to protest independence of the Arabs.
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