'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎187r] (378/386)

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thing he wants is a rapture with Persian Government, so long as ho can avoid
it. And an assurance not personal to himself but in his capacity as the Chief
of Arabs could have been devised, which would make it impossible for him to
force our hands.
My idea would he to write to Sheikh a letter promising good offices, etc ,
in general terms, between Persia and himself, reminding him that his agent
had said he was not afraid of Shah, but had asked if we should forcibly inter
fere in protecting Mohammerah, if the ships of foreign Power (or Russia alone
if preferred) attacked it, whether as an enemy or as a pretended friend of
Persia, and stating that in this case we should do so, provided, however, that
his actions in the past had been and continued to be guided by our advice. I
have told him already that we cannot pro ect him in same form, as we regard
him as Persian subject. To Grand Vizier I would say, should Persian Govern
ment, disregarding our views, adopt any measures towards Arabs which were
likely to disturb peace and trade ou lower Karun, we reserved our rights to
take such naval action at Mohmmerah as we considered to be required by our
interests.
1 hardly think that we can say less to either party if we wish our words
to have any effect.
I shall send Sheikh a present of a rifle and money.
80
Telegram, dated the 4th December 1902.
From—The Secretary of State, London,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta.
Please refer to your Foreign—Secret telegram of the 26th November.
Mohammerah. I communicated your telegram to Lord Lansdowne. He had
it before him during his correspondence with Hardinge, to whose No. 47 of
2Sth November he has replied as follows '.—Begins. I should wish to have
text of the material portion of your letter to Sheikh. I see no objection to
informing him that we would protect Mohammerah against naval attack by a
foreign Power, whatever pretext might be alleged; and we might equally
promise that so long as he remains faithful to the Shah and acts in accordance
with our.advice, he will have our good offices and support. The language
[? interview] you propose holding to [? with] Grand Vizier seems suitable.
Ends.
81
No. 27 (Secret—Frontier), dated Fort William, the 4th February 1904.
From—The Government of India in the Foreign Department,
To—The Eight Hon’ble St. John Brodrick, His Majesty’s Secretary of State for
India.
There are several remarks in the papers submitted to us with which we
do not find ourselves in agreement, and which we only mention here, because
the acceptance or rejection of the views which they express affects to a large
extent the conclusions at wdiich it is possible to arrive. We do not at all agree
that, if Great Britain found it necessary under any conditions to occupy a port
or ports in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , Germany, France and lurkey would neccssaiily
or naturally do the same. The situation in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. bears little or
no resemblance to that in the Gulf of Pechili: and there is not the same
provocation to international rivalry that there was in the latter quarter. . We
are not aware of any authoritative ground for the belief that, if Great Britain