'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎121r] (246/386)

137
the Meshed-Seistan line to balance the Russians there and that they should be
instructed to accept messages in English. The party at Robat were however, only
linesmen and not signallers and could not therefore be employed as propos^.
With reference to the Government of India telegrana of the _ 17th March Sir
A Hardinge reported on the following day that the Persian Government
had agreed to the Henjam^Bunder Abbas extension, but expressed his conviction
that the Shah would prove unyielding in the matter of the Koh - i-Mahk Si ah
extension. His Majesty’s Government therefore left it (10th April) to Sir A.
Harding’s discretion to select a favourable moment for pressing the Kohu-
Malik liah extension. A hint on this subject had in the meanwhile been given
n^ain in a note to the Mushir-cd-Dowleh, dated the 20th March 190o when he
was informed that if the report that the Persian Government contemplated con
necting Meshed and Astrabad by a telegraph line via Bajgiran on the Perso-
Russian frontier should turn out true, the British Government would expect, m
return for such a concession to the Russian Government, permission to connect
Hasratabad with the Indian frontier at Koh-i-Malik Siah.
33 The assurance that the Meshed-Seistan line would not be transferred to
the Russians was reaffirmed categorically in a not© from the Mushir-ed- Dowleh,
dated the 14th November 1904, but was soon falsified. On the 22nd May 190 j.
Sir A Hardin^e reported that the Mushir-ed-Bowieh had informed him t ia
the Shah, on the eve of his departure for Europe, had consented, under renewed
Russian pressure to allow Russian telegraphists “ provisional access to offices
on the Meshed-Seistan line.
34 In these circumstances the Government of India proposed to the Secre-
tary of State on die 22nd June to depute two more English signallers, who were
despatched in the following September, one to be posted at Turbat, the otbei
at Hiriand, and suggested that concessions similar to those granted to Russia >o h
as regards signallers and mechanics to repair breaks and perform other duties on
the line should be claimed in fulfilment of Sir A. Hardinge s warning to the
Persian Government that we should claim concessious identical with those
Granted to the Russians. At the same time the Viceroy said it would be preferable
to obtain compensation elsewhere such as linking up Nasratabad and Robat and
in return to withdraw, at any time, signallers on the northern section. Meanw i e
Sh- A Hardinge had been pressing for the connection suggested by the Govern-
mentof India and had extracted f rom the Mushir-ed-Dowleh an avowalthat per-
i in ,i been o-iven for the construction of a telegraph line from Kuchan to
fhe Transcaspian frontier. In view of this concession by the Shah to the Russians
Se Bniish demTud was considered reasonable by the Persian Minister for
Porei-n Affairs who added that the settlement of the question must await the
foreign incurs gbah’s return, and Sir A. Hardinge tele-
* r/rfc chapter xv, paragraph 70 ,pages 115 lie. that he w^as “pretty eonfident
of obtaining it.” The matter was again pressed during Lord Curzon’s Vice-
royalty in "connection with the destruction of the Mission huts.* No decision
had, however, been taken by the Persian Government before Lord Curzon left
India.
35 These two questions from time to time arose together in connection
ineseiwoq with K uss i a n schemes for dominating
Seistan, and, jointly, were the occasion of
revenue grain to the Russian Bank. very important pronouncements bein n
made by His Majesty’s Government to the Government of the Shah on the
subject* of British interest in that province.
36 On 23th April 1901 Lord Curzon telegraphed to the Secretary of State
that there were rumours that Russia contemplated ^ e r the purelmse of
Seistan or the farming of Seistan revenues from Persia. His Lxcellency pomte i
o„f that any such action would he fatal to our rapidly expanding trade and
rould consSte a grave ultmior menace to B^uchistan, and the suggestion was
British Government in' Seistan* a nd"ofrour inability to acquiesce in its extmetion,
the^uhsfimce'of the^freroy’^telegrain'to^r A.'llardinge^nnd conchidcd^wfrh
Russia (For 6 frrZt acLun^of’sale of sltTnVnTS paragraphs 56-59.)