Notes Prepared for Reference during Curzon’s Tour of the Persian Gulf, and Other Papers on Persia and the Persian Gulf [‎257r] (513/678)

was quartered. Nothing is more surprising than the small number of armed men
required to dominate a Persian town or district. A force equivalent to a single
regiment would, I believe, amply suffice for Shuster and the neighbourhood—say 400 or
500 infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and a couple of guns.
Such a force would further be a nucleus for the extension of our influence among
the Bakhtiaris and Arabs. Our officers w r ould soon get some knowledge of the
surrounding tribes from which their recruits would be drawn, and if we ever desired to
extend the system the foundation would have been laid.
A similar corps could at any time be raised in Ispahan, where the Zil-es-Sultan
would, I feel sure, be delighted to see it.
I fully realize the objections to this proposal, and I have not put it forward without
long and serious consideration. It means pressure brought to bear upon the Persian
Government at a time w'hen in many ways we are getting on very well with them; it
also means some trouble hereafter in securing regular payments; it probably means
some expense to ourselves: and it may mean that w r e shall alarm Russia and provoke
her to some vigorous countermove. She is at present believed to be seriously con
templating the establishment of Consulates in Ispahan and Shiraz and Bushire, and any
such step as I have proposed might accelerate her movements. Nevertheless, from the
point of view of this Legation, I think that we should gain more by it than we could
lose. It would be by no means an unmixed evil if we were to show the Persian Govern
ment that there are some limits to our forbearance, which they are inclined to doubt.
The expense to ourselves would at the worst be inconsiderable. And though I think our
proper course with regard to the Russians in Persia is to avoid all sensational and
provocative measures, I believe this measure could be carried out without grave con
sequences, more especially as there is some talk of augmenting the numbers of the
Cossack Brigade in Tehran.
I would not, however, advocate that we should insist at all hazards upon raising such
a force as I have suggested. I should like to see it raised, for I believe nothing else
would so effectually strengthen our influence in the south of Persia; but if the Persians
agreed in preference to the establishment of a considerable Indian escort in Shuster, or
if they made prompt and effective arrangements on their orra account for the dispatch to
Shuster of thoroughly trustworthy troops from elsewhere, then we might suspend the
proposal. In fact, while trying to secure our object, I think we might avoid presenting
a formal demand.
What we really want in the first place is to secure the safety of our traders and
their property, and possibly we may find that this can be secured without raising a force
under British officers. If so, perhaps we need not press for anything more.
I should he glad to be favoured with an expression of your Lordship’s views upon
this proposal. I can imagine that it may at first sight seem a somewhat dangerous one,
but the present state of Shuster is exceedingly had, and if our trade is to be developed
something must he done to maintain order and security there for the future.
As to the troubles on the Shiraz road, I presume I am right in insisting upon the
right of our traders to receive from the Persian Government either the goods which
have been stolen, with compensation for any damage done, or the full value of those
goods. The Persian Government practically admit that they are bound by this
principle.
I have, &c.
(Signed) H. M. DURAND.
Inclosure in No. 1 .
Statement of Mr. Taiifield.
AT the time I came down to Bussorah, last August, with the small-pox, while on
the “ Malamir,” off Muhammera, I put my watch and chain under my pillow. It was
stolen during the night. I suspected Saduk, my butler, and when I got back to Shuster
I discharged him. About two months later I took him back into my service, not being’
able to get another servant at Shuster. When Mr. Richards left for London I went to
Ahwaz and took over charge. After making up my cash account at the end of the
month following that in which I took over charge, I found it over 1,018 krans short. I
asked Saduk whether any one had been about the office while the money was out of the
safe. He replied, nobody except himself. About the same time I also missed 12 rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf.
and 2 krans of my private money. I taxed him with having stolen the missing money.