Coll 28/117 ‘Persia. Kerman, Yezd – (Bandar Abbas): Intelligence Summaries.’ [‎55r] (112/517)

si)
- 3 -
4. (a)
Booim ;, r'el
r rh^ first vi^w is that Hus a in Fh an is an nnprinciplsd
r*. If not hi ns elf n rotifer on this
point there are interesting divergencies of opinion) he is re
sponsible through his followers for nont of the robberies that
occur. The excuse that he is afraid of the British tovemnent is a
blind. This view was put forvard by Thank at, the trusted
adviser of the General Officer fonnanding.
lrani an
\
on
variant
Oonnany
of this view in held by Anveri, the Anglo-
spent. wh'
considers that all the officials
including the G n ral Orficer Ch landing are partners with
Hussain Than in looting the countryside* There appears to be
general agreement that the junior off icials at least are hand in
glove with the ro bers and that it would be impossible to clean
up t e position satisfactorily with the present n-endar-terie.
6 . ri his party was further of opinion that a written
assurance won Id be of no nee. Pf1 he reason advanced for this view
was that it would give Hussain t*h«n an increased sense of his
own importance and make hin more obstinate than ever. The real
reason v/an possibly that some at least of my informants reap a
rich Trofit from the robbers and have no wiah to see 'mssain Khan
reconciled v/ith the authorities.
7 . (b) The oth r main view is that Hussain Khan is genuinely
afraid of the British Government. He is an opium addict, nervous and
excitable, and surrounded by bpd advisers who persuade him not to
listen to the advice even of his own son Akbar vhan. His champions
(e.g. kbnr Khan and Paji Kotamned) maintain that he is not a robber
and not responsible the robberies. Another view (Firoz Bin,
British subject) is that he does rob or allow his followers tc^ rob,
but this is not due to his own inclination: he is incited and black
mailed into it by the local officials and others who wish to share
in the proceeds c the very persons who pay be putting forward view
(a) above*
n. It ie Hfficult to arrive at the truth between these
conflicting views. On "y way down I raw Akbar F’han again and ik-
■nressed on him that he should convey the verbal assurance to his
father and uernuade him to come to Ker tan, and make his peace*
Akbnr Khan, I tl i^k, is genuinely grateful for the consideration
shown to his famil but doubtfrl of his ability to influence his
lather. On my -ay bock I saw first the recently appointed Com
mander of the garrison Colonel B-hrami. Unlike sc many oi the
officials ho took the view tb-t a written guarantee might turn
the scale. I t)i§n saw Haji Potammed (in the temporary absence
was informed that Hussain Khan was still moving
though he h^d rt ore time come 'Tuch nearer to
to a possible interview with me* Having first
ob" sin-ad from Fuji Mot ammo & an a dirt ssion that if I wrote to Hussain
Khnn on behalf of the British Government there would be nothing
further to -o^^vent his coming into Kerman, I delivered to him th.a
written assurance, which I had urepared, to be con' , ^eyod tc Hussain
'than, in a slightly amended form vide Appendix 1. He declared
that the assurance was entirely satisfactory, and that he would do
his best to nersuade Hussain T 'han to come in.
Q, Whatever the t~uth about Hussain ’"ban’s state of mind and
activities T consider that we shall not lose by this line of action.
Tf he is genuinely anxious tc come tc terns and has only been dis
suaded by bad and malfcious advisers he will now know
i n ea^wact. Tf, on the other h*>nd, he ^refers to Continue as
an outlaw *nd robhef he will noon break the conditions of our
a a mi ranee to hi-, an* we shall he in a strong position to press
the Persian authorities to round, him up.
In an Interview with the hovernor-Oeneral on March 4th
of Akbar Khnn) aun
about in the hills
HIKTAIT with a vie'