File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎61v] (120/450)

opinion that Rabegh could and should be held if there were a Turkish advance in force.
The Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. concurred in the reason which Captain Lawrence gave for Colonel Bremond’s
attitude; he had just returned from Rabegh, and was of opinion that four batteries and
six French battalions would be required for its defence.
As to the second question, the Sherif would prefer British to French troops, but^
if Briti h are not available [ ? he would gladly], in the great emergency foreshadowed,
accept an offer of the others. This occurred during the previous scare of an advance, when
he was told definitely that British would not be landed in Hejaz, but that he was free
to accept any offer of assistance made by the French. The Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. considered that,
should a like emergency again arise, we should not be justified in advising him to refuse
French help. The Sherif was well aware that the troops must be accompanied by
Christian officers and personnel ; he had no objection to their presence in the coast
towns, but he would rightly object to their march inland, on the grounds Captain
Lawrence had so clearly indicated. It was on this understanding that all plans for
training the Sheriffs levies had been based, and the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. still hoped that the French
would be induced to send their batteries and machine guns irom Suez to Rabegh ; for,
when the training of the Arab personnel had been completed, they would be urgently
required by Faisal, Ali, and Abdulla.
In reply to the third question, he said that if French infantry could be spared to
meet the possible emergency of a Turkish advance on Rabegh he should certainly
recommend its despatch to buez, there to await the Sheriffs call; but if their presence
in other theatres of war made this impossible, he still urged that their guns and machine
guns should be sent to Rabegh, whence (If on the advance of the enemy it were decided
to evacuate the place) the French personnel could by removed.
In regard to the fourth question, he said that he fully understood the objections
to landing British troops in Hejaz in view of the importance of the operations against
the Hejaz railway which Sir A. Murray was initiating from Sinai, and also on account
Indian susceptibilities. For those reasons, as well as for those indicated in the reply
to the second question, he recommended the despatch of French troops in an emergency,
as he was of the opinion that they might avert the complete collapse of the Sherif’s
movement, which he understood was the main object of His Majesty’s Government.
French Guns for the Sherif.
Sir R. Wingate telegraphed on the 24th November [No. 35 j that Colonel Bremond
had informed him that the French Government intended to put the two batteries now
at Suez at the Sheriffs disposal and in addition six mountain guns 80-mm. calibre,
with harness and munitions but without personnel. He hoped that a message of
thanks would he sent to the French Government, and that the guns might be
despatched to Rabegh at an early date. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
telegraphed to Lord Bertie [No. 2738] on the 27th November asking him to thank the
French Government and to urge the early despatch of these guns to Rabegh.
Turkish Force in Hejaz.
IXM.L, Egypt, telegraphed to D.M.I. [LA. 2645] on the 21 st November that as a
result of information from a very reliable source he was led to believe that the total
Turkish forces in Hejaz of all arms and services amount roughlv to 12,000 men. This
was advanced from a certain statement in regard to supply. And on the following day
a further telegram [LA. 2648] added that it was indicated, by further information
received from an absolutely reliable source, that the Turks were finding the supply of
their forces in Hejaz a matter of difficulty and that they had had to draw on their
: reserves in the local supply depot at Medina.
Hejaz Railway.
Specially made bombs have been dropped with good result on the Hejaz railway
at five points in the vicinity of Maan : with the bombs propaganda papers were dropped.
Ill-treatment of the People of Medina by the Turks.
The Force I) weekly summary No. 85, dated the 16th October, says :
“The O.P.O. forwards a letter from Ibn Saud received by him and
acknowledging receipt of a letter from the Viceroy. He mentions having had news