File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎34v] (66/450)

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With the exception of the Bishawi retainers and the “ soldiers ” at Babegh tl|ese
forces are entirely tribal. About 10 per cent, are Camel Corps and the rest infantry
some of whom are desert tribes and some hill tribes. I did not see much (or think
much) of the desert tribes, but the hillmen struck me as good material for guerilla
warfare They are hard and fit, very active, independent, cheerful snipers. _ They will
serve only under their tribal sheikhs and only in their home district, or near it. T ley
have suspended their blood feuds for the period of the war, and will fight side by side
with their old blood enemies if they have a Sherd in supreme command ; except
exceptional circumstances they wonld not, I think, obey the orders °
to any other tribe. The lack of disciphne-or, rather, of control—allows them to go
home and see their wives and families when they please, if they produce a substitute
The personnel of the army thus changes incessantly; this is inevitable m tubal
'VVcLI*i?£lI*G • •
There is a sheikh usually to every hundred or so men. He is paid their wages,
and is resoonsible for their being fed and ready for action m their stated strength
when called upon. . . p f-n
Tactics .—The tribal armies are aggregations of snipers only. Before this war they
had slow, old muskets, arid they have not yet appreciated fully the uses of a magazine
rifle. They would not use bayonets, but enjoy cutting with swords. No man quite
trusts his neighbour, though each is usually quite whole-hearted in his opposition to the
Turks. This would not prevent him working off a family grudge by letting down his
private enemy. In consequence, they are not to be relied on for attack in mass. Ih e y
are extremely mobile, and will climb or run a great distance to be in a safe place for a
shot—preferably at not more than 300 yards range, though they are beginning to use
their sivhts empirically. They shoot well at short ranges, and do not expend much
ammunition when in contact with the enemy, though there is any amount of joy-firing
at home. Feisal gives them fifty cartridges each, keeps a tight hold of his reserves, and
prevents waste as far as possible.
The Arabs have a living terror of the unknown. This includes at present
aeroplanes and artillery. The sound of the discharge of a cannon- sends every man
within earshot to cover. They are not afraid of bullets, or of being killed -it is just
the manner of death by artillery that they cannot stand. They think guns much more
destructive than they really are, but their moral confidence is probably as easily
restored as it is easily shaken. A few guns—useiul or useless—on their side would
encourage them to endure the Turkish artillery, and, once they get to know it, most of
their terror will pass. At present they fight only at night, so that the Turkish guns
shall be blind.
Political Situation in Hejaz.
The political situation in Hejaz is dominated by King Hussein’s vacillation between
begging for European troops and then going back on his request. This is easily under
standable, the King knows that once European troops are landed that his prestige is
gone, and that the Arabs will probably join the Turks ; on the other hand, he knows
that unaided his army cannot keep the Turks out of Mecca if they have enough
transport and supplies to carry them thither. Consequently, when Pie Turks seem
likely to advance King Hussein asks for troops, when they retire he thinks better of it.
European troops in Hejaz are a last resource. If it were possible to collect a Moslem
force of infantry 4,000 strong, with European officers, it would, relieve permanently a