Ext 5000/41(1) 'Persia: situation leading up to, and after, the Allied occupation' [‎226r] (451/606)

Draft Paper.
Department.
H.M.G. *3 conclusion is therefore that economic sanctions
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produced might not merely
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would be slow in producing results and that such results as were
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not be favourable to our interests but might
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precipitate situation in Which military action would be necessary
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for which we a*»e not fully prepared. As observed in your 3o90 first
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essential is to limit military commitments. / the whole problem of
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ensuring that we succeed in securing the expulsion of the German
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colory must /depend on the feasibility of military measures or the
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show of them in conjunction with the Russians. This question has now
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been considered by the Chiefs of Staff and you will no doubt have seen
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the telegram from the War Office to the Commander-in-Chief India of the
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25th July, No. 80081. This ; indicates that the necessary forces could be
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made available but it would not be possible to start military action
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before the second week in August. kjeanwhile-%he Minister at Tehran
has beerymstructed to speak to tile Iranian Government on the lines he
proposed in paragraph 6 of] his telegram No.A54 of the 22nd July
(see P.
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4. As regards your telegram No. 3710 of the 22nd July, H.M.G. feel
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that this seems to indicate a complete misreading of the position due
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*amsL
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partly no doubt to the fact that it was despatched before study of
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They desire to make it clear that there
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all the relevant telegr*
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has never been aiy question of appeasement in the policy adopted
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towards Iran but it has bden essential, before embarking on any action
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which might result in hostilities, to make sure that the necessary
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to deal with ary enemy reactions.
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As the Government of India must be well aware, there were barely
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sufficient forces in Iraq for local requirements and it was clear that
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to obtain the necessary forces troops would have to be^ moved-from
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forces would be available
elsewhere -an the n T|1 11 ;—-Until this fundamental question had been
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cleared up by the Chiefs Staff it was clearly unwise to threaten
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the Iranian Government onto engage in economic sanctions which.
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after the experience in relation to Abyssinia, all would agree should
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only/
(1033?) Wt.14054/P.164 10,000 5/39 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.685
(11704) Wt.2009C/P.282 10,000 9/39