'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME II.' [‎258v] (525/660)

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476 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
Alexandretta .—A safe and secure anchorage, though not so well protected
as Ayas bay. It is subject to strong north-easterly gales in the winter months.
There is no artificial harbour, nor any facilities for landing purposes, except
a few small piers with shallow water at their extremities. It would be most
difficult to protect against submarines owing to the depths of water and that
there is no protection for the vessels supporting the nets. High mountains
he close behind the coast, and marsh land extends inland from the beach.
From a political standpoint, Alexandretta was a very desirable place to
take—and retain. Now it would be a formidable undertaking.
Beirut .—An open roadstead with fairly good holding ground. It is difficult
to defend against submarines, the 20-fathom line being reached at only
8 cables from the shore, and there being no protection for the vessels supporting
the nets.
There is an artificial harbour into which ships of 400 feet drawing 26 feet
of water can enter. Probably four or five could be accommodated. There
are two moles where ships of not more than 21 feet draught can discharge
cargo. For discharging the larger vessels lighters are used. There is a railway
on the quay. On the whole, this is the best and most convenient landing place
from the naval point of view.
The remaining places on the coast are open roadsteads without any facilities,
difficult of protection, exposed to weather, and unsuitable.
Bay of Acre .-—The anchorage off Acre is an open roadstead where ships
could not remain in winter during strong westerly winds. It is exposed to
winds from the N.N.E. to S.S.W.
All cargo would have to be transhipped into lighters—which would have
to be brought—and it would only be possible to discharge ships during off-shore
winds. The depths in the Ancient Port are only suitable for small coasting
craft, and there are no facilities. Few lighters could be unloaded at a time.
Submarine protection by means of temporary nets could be provided in fine
weather, but it would not survive westerly weather. Acre would come under
fire from hills about 4^ miles inland beyond the flat plain, and any position
in the vicinity of Acre would be commanded by these hills.
Haifa in the south-west corner of the Bay of Acre is a much better anchorage,
but it is quite exposed to the north-west, and ships cannot rely on remaining
at anchor except in the summer months.
Submarine protection would be less difficult than off Acre, but would have
to be of a temporary nature in the winter. There is more protection than off
Acre, and lighters could be worked alongside ships when it would not be
possible off Acre. Cargo would have to be landed from lighters, which would
have to be brought; there are small quays with about 6 feet of water alongside.
A few well-placed guns on Mount Carmel would make the bay untenable,
unless the mount were captured and held, which, from the nature of the
ground, would be a difficult operation, as ships’ gunfire would not be of
much assistance.
ANNEXURE D.
The Maintenance of a Turkish Force in Mesopotamia.
1. The Turkish forces in Mesopotamia have never probably exceeded 35,000.
The force has gradually dwindled to 9,000 men, and no fresh divisions have
been reported at any time as arriving in this theatre from elsewhere.
It is probable that supply difficulties, and more especially a. lack of river
craft, have set limitations on the size of the force acting in this area.
2. The existing lines of supply are :—
River Tigris ;
River Euphrates.
The Samarra-Baghdad railway, about 60 miles in length, can hardly be
regarded as a line of supply, as it is believed that the only rolling stock on it
is for construction purposes.