‘Russo-Turkish War, 1877. Operations in Asia.’ [‎39v] (12/42)

2nd inst. and which he had so signally defeated. No doubt he was now, owing
to the disappearance of his Kurdish and Circassian scouts, kept very badly
informed of all Russian movements; he knew, however, on the 13th that a
strong Russian force had appeared at Digor, still it does not appear as it he
made any preparations to retire on the 14th, ami it was not apparently until
the evening of that day that he seems to have fully realised the danger that
threatened him, and ordered a retreat to Kars on the same night, as the result
of the partial success gained by General Lazareff during the day.*
The resolution on the part of Mukhtar Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. to retire had, however, been
too long deferred. During the night, the Russian force in his rear had firmly
established itself on the ground it had won during the day, threatening
Vezin-Keui, and the first instalment only of Turkish baggage had been safely
conveyed to that point, the animals being on their return journey in the morning
to remove a second instalment, when the general attack commenced which was
to decide the fate of Mukhtar Pasha’s force, and ultimately that of Kars.
Battle of the Aladja-Dagh.
The point assailed in the first instance by the Russians was the Aulia-
Tepeh, held by 4 battalions of Turkish infantry with 3 field and 4 mountain
guns.
Between 8 and 9 a.m. General Heimann had brought forward 5 heavy
field batteries + (40 9-pr. guns), and from these, supplemented by the fire of 3
batteries,]; established on the Great Yahni-Tepeh (9-prs.), and 3 siege guns at
Hadjiveli (in all G7 guns), there rained, for not less than three hours,§ such a storm
of shell and shrapnel on the Aulia-Tepeh as threatened the utter annihilation of
the gallant defenders before the assault took place. Such, however, was soon
found not to be the case, for on the position being attacked about noon by 13
Russian battalions,|| so stoutly did the brave fellows defending it cling to their
posts, that during the musketry fight which ensued, they repulsed 3 successive
attacks of the Russian infantry before a circumstance occurred which caused
them to give way and on the fourth attack taking place, to abandon the hill.
This they did so deliberately, walking leisurely away and allowing themselves
to be fired on by their puisuers without returning a shot, as to convince their
comrades on the adjoining Nahlend-Tepeh that their resistance had been
prolonged to the last cartridge.
The circumstance above referred to was the extraordinary behaviour of
5 Turkish battalions with a field battery, which (in co-operation with other
troops from the side of the Aladja-Dagh) had been ordered up from the Sivri-
Tepeh to assist in the defence of the Aulia-Tepeh by taking the assailants in
both flanks. The battalions in question were observed to be very tardy in * * * §
* It is only fair to state, that on the 13th the Turkish General received a telegram from
Constantinople, in which he was informed that a serious insurrection had broken out in
Daghestan, and that the Russian force he was opposed to would detach 20 battalions to assist in
suppressing it. He was, at the same time, informed that he might first expect a formidable
attack. According to all accounts, this telegram was implicitly believed in at the Turkish head
quarters. It had also been observed by the Turks that the baggage and camp epuipage that had
been sent to Alexandropol by the Russians on the night of the lst-2nd instant had not returned, their
troops having bivouacked in the open ever since ; and Mukhtar Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. may have been led to believe
that this indicated the probable retirement of the Russian force in his front. Still no sign of a retreat
had appeared, nor was it to be inferred that such a step was contemplated by the Russians from
any of their movements or manoeuvres up to this date, and certainly not from their continual
employment of siege artillery in the open.
f 5 batteries of the Caucasus Grenadier Field Artillery Brigade.
j The 2nd Battery 1st (Moscow) Grenadier Field Artillery Brigade, the 2nd Battery
21st Field Artillery Brigade, and the 3rd Battery 39th Field Artillery Brigade.
§ The Russian field batteries at first opened fire at their usual respectful range, biit soon
finding the Turkish artillery opposed to them very weak, limbered up and moved forward after
about an hour’s firing to within 1,800 or 2,000 yards of the Turks, and now used almost
exclusively shrapnel with time fuzes. The precision of their fire seems to have been very
remarkable on this occasion, and the summit of the Aulia-Tepeh is said by an eye-witness to have
been completely enveloped in the smoke of their bursting projectiles. This was afterwards
verified by the large number of Turks found killed and wounded in their trenches by artillery fire.
|| The 13th (Erivan) and 14th (Georgia) Grenadiers and the 151st (Piatigoi-sk) regiments, and
the 1st Battalion Caucasus Chasseurs.