Ext 5001/41 'PERSIA – INTERNAL (Miscellaneous despatches).' [‎77r] (153/248)

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Dr. Millspaugh, of the work of grain collecting. Much of the detailed organisa
tion has been entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Attaullah, Indian Medical Service,
who is rendering invaluable service in supervising the work of provinicial grain
collecting centres, implementing the recommendations of our consular liaison
officers and helping to plan the day-to-day policy of the Cereals and Bread
Section.
Persian Army and Gendarmerie.
^a) Army.
41. Although little or no improvement is visible in the Persian forces,
some preliminary measures towards reform have been taken. The Majlis has
passed Bills authorising the engagement of thirty American military officers
as advisers to the Persian army, of eight as advisers to the gendarmerie, and of
the American police expert, Timmerman, as director-general of the police. It
is understood that the United States Government is unwilling to provide the
full number of military officers required. It is certain that no adequate measure
of reform can be achieved in any reasonable time with much less than these
numbers, and, as the reform of the forces is essential to the stability of Persia,
it is to be hoped that the United States Government will be persuaded to extend
the limit they have now imposed of eleven officers for the army and three for
the gendarmerie.
42. There are now the Minister for War, the Under-Secretary for Mar,
and the Chief of the Staff, officers who are not only friendly to us, but are
prepared to co-operate loyally with the American advisers. In opposition,
however, to the grant of any considerable measure of authority to the American
advisers are the Russians, the Shah and certain Persian officers. Ihe Shah
not only dislikes to admit that any foreign control is necessary hut fears that
the American advisers may strengthen the authority of the Ministry for War
over the army to the detriment of his own. He clings hard to his ambition to
be commander-in-chief in fact as well as in name. Popular clamour forced
him to sign, very reluctantly, a decree making clear that the Minister for M r ar
was responsible for the army, subordinating the Chief of the Staff, who had,
until then, taken his orders direct from the Shah, to the Minister and limiting
his own powers to certain prerogatives of approval, but he has never willingly
accepted this position. He has recently appointed to his ^ personal staff two
senior officers, General Yazdan Panah as his Aide-de-Camp-General, and
General Razmara as Chief of his Military Secretariat, both of whom have
recently been Chief of Staff and resigned from that appointment owing to their
unwillingness to subordinate themselves to the Minister of War. They are
both notoriously hostile to foreign influence in the army. This has led to
strained relations between himself and his Minister for War and Chief of
Staff, since these officers realise that they have been displaced as the Shah’s
military advisers by Generals \azdan Panah and Razmara. Yazdan
Panah and Razmara'have some following in the army among those who, for
reasons of pride or profit, resent the advent of the American advisers. There
is reason to believe that they are supported and encouraged by the Russians,
who, for reasons of their own, object to the extension of American influence in
Persia. The result of their appointment has been to increase disunion in the
army, to dimmish the authority of the Minister for M ar and to incline officers
to look more to the Court than to the Ministry and the Chief of Staff. It is
natural to see a close connexion between this renewed attempt by the Shah to
control the army and his desire, to which reference was made in the second
paragraph of this report, to set up a Cabinet of his own choosing in the interval
between the dissolution of the present Majlis and the opening of its successor.
43. The Shah agreed that the Ministry for War should draft regulations
to define the functions of his Military Secretariat in consultation with General
Ridley and the Belgian Military Attache, the latter, because the Persian Con
stitution follows the Belgian to some extent as regards the relation of the Crown
to the army. General Ridley has given his opinion in writing that the Shah
has no need of a military secretariat except for ceremonial duties. This has
not disposed the Shah more kindly to the American advisers, though the Belgian
Military Attache is also understood to have said that Belgian experience was
against such an institution.
44. General Ridley’s contract has now been drafted by the Ministry for
War. It is understood that it gives him satisfactory control over the administra
tion of the army and some control over the appointment and promotion of officers
[48—51] c