Ext 5001/41 'PERSIA – INTERNAL (Miscellaneous despatches).' [‎59v] (118/248)

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take an intimate and aggressive interest in the execution of their schemes. Such
of these as have been initiated are not functioning in a manner that carries
conviction of their value, but this is due more to a lack of determination in
operation than to unsoundness in the schemes. It should, however, be remembered
that the advisers are very few for the difficult task before them. W ith the arrival
of more officers it is to "be hoped that the situation will improve. Of the nine
additional officers demanded from America to make a total of twenty, two h«g"
arrived and seven are on the way. They will, however, continue to be handi
capped in relation to the opposition until they are vested with such powers and
influence as will establish them as the deciding factor in the advancement of
officers. What is needed is that they should have the full support and confidence
of the Shah. It is to be regretted that this they have so far failed to get. The
Shah is disappointed because they have been unsympathetic to his desires for
a large army with quantities of the most modern arms and because they have
hitherto failed to obtain more than a few items of the stores and equipment he
would like to have. Moreover, he has allowed himself to be persuaded by the
hostile criticism of his two irresponsible military advisers, Generals Yazdan
Panah and Razmara, and the implied criticism of the Russians, that the proposals
of the American advisers, even those to which he has already given his approval,
are unsuited to the conditions of Persia.
47. The American mission has begun the organisation of transport units
equipped principally with the 600 trucks recently received from American sources.
Here they claim to be making progress in spite of the many difficulties that arise
from indiscipline, corruption, lack of workshop equipment for maintenance and
of trained personnel. Their plans are ready for the organisation of field medical,
signal and engineer units as soon as equipment is obtained. The new systems of
supply and pay have not yet convinced the private soldier that there is anything
of the fairy godmother about the American advisers. Lack of reliable personnel,
lack of funds and lack of stores—such reserves as there were having been consumed
during the last two years without replenishment—have effectively prevented the
successful operation of the new system.
48. For a time the Shah’s head seemed to be completed turned by his con
versation with Marshal Stalin during the Tehran Conference and by the latter’s
offer to him of a gift of tanks and aircraft. He appeared to have convinced him
self that he would have Stalin’s support in his ambition to have a large army
under his personal command and Stalin’s assistance in equipping it. He sought
for means to please his Russian friends. He dismissed the pro-British Minister
of War. General Ahmadi; and later General Ansari, the Under-Secretary of
State for War, who was also displeasing to the Russians. He was also clearly
anxious to replace General Riazi, the Chief of Staff, who has co-operated frankly
with us and with the American advisers, by General Yazdan Panah, who would
be more acceptable to himself and the Russians. Fearing, perhaps, that to do so
immediately would appear too obviously as an anti-British gesture, he postponed
action until the formation of a new Cabinet gave him opportunity of getting rid
of General Riazi from the General Staff by appointing him as Minister of
Education. His successor has not yet been named.
49. Reflection and the views of his Ministers have to some extent modified
his elation and roused doubts of the disinterestedness of the Russian gift, to
which it has been found certain unwelcome conditions were attached. For the
Russian offer extends to the organisation of tank and aircraft regiments with a
strong framework of Russian personnel, and obvious Persian unwillingness to
walk into this trap may result in the withdrawal of the bait.
50. There has been much discussion as to the strength of the army that
should be budgeted for in the financial year just beginning. The Shah held out
for 120,0Q0; Dr. Millspaugh maintained that he could not find more money than
the 100 million tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. allotted for the past year. The final decision of the
Government was that the Ministry for War should budget for a strength of
90.000 Dr. Millspaugh being left to find the money as best he could. The Shah
has, however, demanded that a further credit should be allotted for an additional
10.000 men, to be drawn against only if circumstances should demand this
increase to the army. The organisation on which the figure of 90,000 is based
that is ten divisions, each with a strength of 5,000-6,000, and, in addition,
independent cavalry and mechanised brigades in the capital—has been considered
by the Commander-in-chief of Persia and Iraq Force and it is understood that
he considers it reasonable having regard to the task before the army.
51. (b) Gendarmerie .—In the gendarmerie Colonel Schwarzkopf has been
given extensive authority and has, in practice, complete control of the force,