Coll 17/10(4) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎305v] (610/1031)

influenced by external factors, except perhaps in a negative sense; they have been
rather the natural sequel to what had happened just before.
3. The new Cabinet was constituted as follows :—
Survivals from the last Cabinet—
Prime Minister and Defence : Taha-al-Hashimi.
Interior and Justice : Umar Nadhmi.
Education : Sadiq Bassam.
New Ministers—
Foreign Affairs : Tewfiq Suwaidi.
Finance and Communications : Ali Mumtaz
Economics : S. Abdul Mahdi.
Social Affairs : Hamdi-al-Pachachi.
4 . I do not agree with those who maintain that tl T ..
composition, is no better than the old. r l he three wild men, Rashid A i, i a ] 1
Shawkat and Naji Suwaidi, have gone. Of the survivors from the last Cabinet,
Umar Nadhmi now ranks third in importance as a Minister and can be counted
upon to be friendly, if a trifle cautious and unimaginative; Sadiq Bassam
follows Taha unquestioningly and will not influence higher policy one way or
the other. Of the new men, Tewfiq Suwaidi is essentially friendly and can
influence his colleagues more effectively than Nuri, who is now a lonely figure in
Iraqi politics and, for all his goodwill, is liable to be in effect an anti-British
irritant rather than a pro-British tonic. Saiyid Abdul Mahdi was tlm leader
of the Shia block of Deputies who first began to show opposition to Rashid All
in the Majlis. Hamdi-al-Pachachi is, it is true, president of the Palestine
Defence Society, but he is one of the politicians of the old school (he last held
office in the Cabinet of Abdul Muhsin-al-Sa’dun in 19*25-26), most of whom have
mellowed from bitter opponents of the mandate into good friends and supporters
of the alliance. Ali Mumtaz is an able civil servant, who knows English well
and has worked harmoniously with British officials; his influence is not likely
to be used in a hostile sense, though in any groupings within the Cabinet he, like
Sadiq Bassam, would automatically line up with his uncle-in-law, Paha.
5 . But if Taha-al-Hashimi was the key man of the last three Administra
tions he is naturally more than ever the key man of the Cabinet oyer which he
himself presides. He is, and must be for some time, the slave of his own past;
and that is why I devoted so much space to that past in my letter of the
15th February. If there has been no abrupt reversal of policy it is because Taha
was himself largely responsible for the policy pursued by Rashid Ali’s Cabinet.
6 . On the 6 tli February Taha Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. made a statement in the Majlis refuting
the tendentious and mischievous parts of Rashid Ali’s letter of resignation and
professing loyalty to the alliance in less ambiguous terms than his predecessor.
On the 22nd February he made a second statement, the principal feature of which
was the affirmation 'that the Government intended to strengthen the position
of Parliament and submit to its control. The refusal of the Regent to dissolve
Parliament on the 30th January, followed by the Prime Minister’s declaration,
encouraged Deputies to speak more outspokenly than has been their wont for
some years; there were lively debates in the Chamber of Deputies daily from
the 23rd to 26th February, and in the Senate on the 27th and following days;
the tone of the speeches was almost unanimously hostile to Rashid Ali (who did
not venture to attend after the first day) and favourable to the Regent and the
policy of honest implementation of the alliance. There has been a tendency in
some quarters to pooh-pooh these debates as futile academic exercises because
the Government was not thereby forced to take any drastic or spectacular action.
I do not agree. The speeches have set a fashion of more outspoken declarations
in our favour and given a healthy lead to public opinion which had hitherto been
conspicuously lacking; it is significant that the rumours current during March
of an impending military ccw/? cVfitat invariably dated it “ after the prorogation
of Parliament,” an admission that a live Parliament in session may prove a
partial corrective to the military domination of politics of the last few years.
The Majlis was prorogued on the 31st March.
7 . Almost immediately on his return to the Ministry of the Interior Umar
Nadhmi caused Captain Majid-al-Hashimi, the Director of Press and Propa-
hie new Cabinet, in its