'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎14r] (32/294)

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The other setback, though more alarming at first, did not in the
end have such far-reaching consequences. On the 1st June the Inspector-
General informed Air Vice Marshal Peirse that serious incidents were
taking place in the police barracks in Jerusalem and Nablus and that he
could no longer rely upon the loyalty of the Arab police. There was
even a risk of their going over to the rebels with their arms. On the
receipt of this information the Air Officer Commanding and the O.C.
British Troops interviewed the High Commissioner, and recommended the
immediate reinforcement of one infantry brigade and the adoption of
repressive measures accompanied by Martial Law. This was not entirely
acceptable to the High Commissioner, who asked for and receivea
permission to continue a policy of ’’reasonable moderation”; though the
reinforcement was agreed upon, and Emergency Regulations were later
introduced which gave increased pov/ers to H.M. Forces and prescribed
heavy penalties for sabotage and shooting etc. It was unfortunate that
these penalties were seldom enforced, for by reason of this the
legislation failed entirely to achieve the objects for which it had
been enacted. Meanwhile it had fortunately been possible to avert the
threatened police mutiny, but from that point onwards the loyalty of the
Arab section in general was always suspect and they ceased to all intents
and purposes to be of any further value in the suppression of the
rebellion. There were of course individual exceptions, and it is
worthy of note that the Arab police continued throughout to carry on the
normal routine duties of peace time.
3rd -7th June
Some anxiety was now being caused by the considerable smuggling o
arms and armed men across the Syrian and Trans-Jordan frontiers, anci
measures had to be taken to prevent it. On the 2nd instructions had been
given to the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force to form a cordon of cavalry
and M.T. patrols from Metulla to the Dead Sea, and on the 4th the
T.J.F.F. Reserve v/as embodied to assist in this task.' It was arrange
that the police should watch the Syrian frontier from Metulla westwards
to the sea, while French cavalry co-operated on the other side of one
border. At sea the 3rd Cruiser Squadron (Rear Admiral G.H.D 0 Lyon,
C.B.), based at Haifa, undertook destroyer patrols along the coast and
posted naval ratings in the Customs House at Haifa. Other naval _
ratings with railway experience had already been landed to act as tram
guards with a view to becoming available as train crews should circum
stances require it. The anti-smuggling cordon left open tne desert
approaches from the South, and it was not until about a month
after the arrival of the 8 th Hussars, that troops could be spare or
this region.
About this time the Government became active in the arrest and intern
ment of agitators, and on the 7th June the Secretary of the Higher
Committee joined some fifty others in an Internment Camp in Sinai.
After that a continual flow of internees was maintained and later tne
camp was moved to Sarafand, but it was significant that neither tne
Mufti nor his principal henchmen ever found their way there. Tne
week of June ended with riots in Haifa and something approaching a pitched
battle between troops and an armed band on the outskirts of Jerusalem.
Wn it hid resulted from au ambush on the Jaffa road just before dark,
the band this time opening fire from some old Turkish trenches on a
convoy of Jewish buses. The Lewis gun of the police escort jammed,
but reinforcements from Jerusalem were soon on the scene. ^ile
attempting to close with the retreating enemy a private of the Cameron
Highlanders was wounded.