'IRAQ AND THE PERSIAN GULF' [‎205v] (415/862)

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298 HISTORY
financial agreement was added to the treaty by which the transfer
of the railways and of the port of Basra to Iraq was effected on much
more generous terms than had been proposed in 1922 (p. 295).
By an exchange of notes at the time of the treaty the Iraqi Govern
ment undertook normally to engage British subjects when in need
of the services of foreign officials, and also admitted the validity of
existing contracts with British officials. Thus Great Britain surren
dered every legal and contractual form of control over the internal
administration of Iraq.
This latter was one of the main points criticized by the League
Committee which examined the proposal to terminate the mandate.
Great concern was expressed for the freedom of minorities and of
religious opinion in an independent Iraq until a declaration was
signed by Iraq which provided against discrimination in elections,
appointments, religion, language, and the expression of public
opinion. The judicial protection of foreigners was secured only by
the Judicial Agreement of 1930, which abolished earlier privileges
but guaranteed the employment of British legal experts in relevant
posts. For ten years ‘most favoured nation’ treatment, subject to
reciprocity, was to be extended in economic matters to States
Members of the League. Under these guarantees, the Committee
agreed with apparent reluctance that Iraq fulfilled four of five con
ditions for national independence, which were that it should (1) have
a settled government and administration capable of maintaining
essential services, (2) be capable of maintaining internal order, (3)
have adequate financial resources to provide for normal administra
tion, (4) possess laws and a judicial organization which could afford
equal and regular justice to all. As for the fifth condition, that a
country should be able to defend itself, Iraq was thought capable of
doing this only by means of the British alliance, which itself, though
regarded with some suspicion, ‘did not explicitly infringe the inde
pendence of the new State’. Even so, the Committee would not have
agreed to end the mandate but for a statement of the High Commis
sioner that should Iraq ‘prove unworthy of the confidence placed
in her, the moral responsibility must rest with His Majesty’s
Government’.
The Council accepted the Committee’s report in January 1932 and
in October Iraq became a full member of the League. The British
High Commissioner was replaced by an ambassador, and relations
between Iraq and Britain were thenceforth governed by the Treaty
of 1930.