Coll 6/9 'Jeddah Reports Jany 1931–' [‎205r] (410/802)

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restart hostilities and had made all preparations for that ^
resumption of hostilities seemed inevitable on the morning of the 29th i a^, u
a communique issued that afternoon announced that the King had deci e o
prolong the truce “ for a few days ” in consideration of fresh assuiances rom
the Imam that he was really getting on with the fulfilment of the conditions, u
that difficulties of communication had caused delay. r . ,
105. The situation was thus uncertain, both from a military and a politica
point of view, at the end of the month. Meanwhile, the situation at Model a
was said to have deteriorated, and reports to that effect were confirmed on an
after the 25th May, when, as a result of the first disquieting
H.M.S. Penzance went back there. The number of Saudi troops at Hodeida
itself had been reduced. The control over the troops as a whole seemed to ha\e
relaxed. The men were unpaid and ammunition was short. No very serious
incidents occurred in the town, but the troops gave trouble in the countryside^ and
cases of rape were producing a revulsion of feeling among the tribes. There
were, moreover, reports more impressive than before of Yemeni concentrations.
The main forces were at Zebid, Menakha and Hajja. I here was, it was said,
to be no general advance pending orders from the Imam, but other Yemeni forces
held positions on an arc extending from east of Medi to Zebid. There was
already frequent skirmishing. On the 31st May the Yemenis from Hajja were
said to be threatening Zohra, 20 miles east of Luhayya, and another 1,000 men
were said to have arrived at Zebid. It looked as though the Imam s game had
been to play once more for time, and as though the prolongation of the truce
might no longer rest with Ibn Sand.
106. Gossip has killed off various high personages, the reports of whose
death have proved to be much exaggerated. It took many days to explode the
rumour, which started in Hodeida on the 1st or 2nd May, that the Imam was
dead. His eldest son was another victim, though he seems to be perfectly fit, and
to be the heart and soul of the war party in the Yemen. The Amir Baud has also
been reported dead or at any rate wounded. ^ ,
107. The Saudi Government replied on the 13th May to the British blue
line note mentioned m paragraph 77 of the last icpoit. The^ were unwilling
to accept the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of 1913 and 1914 as determining the
leo-al position. They asserted no definite views as to what they themselves regard
as the frontier, but expressed readiness to discuss the subject at any time. The
British authorities concerned carried out, without incident, aerial recon
naissances, with naval support, round the coasts of Qatar and across the base
of the peninsula, which were completed on the 9th May.
108 Careful enquiry in Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan has revealed no foundation for the
report (paragraph 79 of last report) that Hamid-bin-Rifada’s son is organising
an anti-Saudi movement.
III .—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.
109. The Saudi Government showed great anxiety during the earlier part
of the month to ascertain the attitude of His Majesty’s Government towards the
Yemen situation, not only as regards its neutral character, which was clearly
affirmed, but also with special reference to His Majesty’s Government’s views
as to the probability of Italian intervention and the position they would take up
if such intervention took place. His Majesty’s Minister was able to allay their
fears to some extent and to head them off formal enquiries as to what His
Majesty’s Government might do in purely hypothetical contingencies, all the
more hypothetical as it was uncertain how far Ibn Saud himself meant to go in
the direction of trying to destroy the Imam.
110. Direct approaches by the Saudi Government to the Italians produced
fairly satisfactory, if not wholly convincing, results. 1 he Italian Charge
d’Affaires in Jedda made a comforting communication to Fuad Bey Hamza on
the 12th May, and its effect was enhanced by friendly conversations between the
Chargd d’Affaires and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 25th-26th May. The fact
remains that the Saudi Government are very suspicious of Italy. They might
be more so, if they knew that the Italians, while doing only a little more than His
Majesty’s Government at Hodeida, have apparently sent at least one ship and
some forces to Mokha, although precise information in regard to their action