Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎106r] (212/540)

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15. Throughout these transactions the Iraqis have made a great show, and
the Saudis some little show, of taking His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom into their confidence. It is doubtful whether the confidence is complete.
Both parties realise that it would be dangerous to go too far in directions which
might indispose His Majesty’s Government. The persons most concerned, how
ever, are all Arab nationalists, who, even if some of them doubt the practicability
of “ pan-Arabism in our time,” regard some sort of pan-Arabism as the ultimate
objective to be steadily pursued. His Majesty’s Government on their side have
not receded from the position (see paragraph 61 of the report for 1934) that they
would view with sympathy a legitimate rapprochement between Saudi Arabia
and Iraq; but they could not view with sympathy or without misgiving a
rapprochement on lines inimical to their interests in Arab countries adjacent to
the two parties.
16. In this connexion reference must be made, not for the only time in this
report, to certain statements attributed to Fuad Bey by the Difaa newspaper of
Jaffa in August. He afterwards told Sir Andrew Ryan that he had not intended
to give an interview, and had refrained from publishing a dementi only because
he thought that it would advertise the matter and lead to further publicity. He
did not deny that the article reflected his sentiments. It represented him as
having spoken of the inevitability of war in Europe, an event in which Arabs
would be guided by their interests not by their feelings. He was said to have
expressed belief in the readiness of both Saudi Arabia and Iraq to seize their
opportunities, of the prospect of an early rapprochement between them and of
the pursuance of parallel policies as something which would conduce to the
realisation of national aspirations.
17. The revolt in the Euphrates region early in the year seems to have had
an unsettling effect on the tribes across the border, but no serious trouble on the
Saudi-Iraqi frontier was reported at any time during the year. Ibn Saud’s
attitude towards the rebellion appears to have been correct and cautious,
although he is sometimes suspected of flirting with Shia elements in Iraq. The
breeze in diplomatic relations described in paragraph 10 of the report for 1934
had no after effects in 1935. The same Saudi Charge d’Affaires remained all
the year in Bagdad. The Iraqi Charge in Jedda went to Bagdad early in April,
leaving only a clerk in charge of the Legation. He never returned, but this was
probably due more to his dislike of Jedda than to anything in the political
relations between the two countries.
(2) Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan .
18. The question of the lie of the Saudi- Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan frontier will be dealt
with in paragraph 59 below, as being mainly a matter affecting Anglo-Saudi
relations. As for the actual situation on the frontier in 1935, it is satisfactory
to note that not a single raid was alleged by way of formal protest from either
side to have occurred during the year; nor has there been any evidence of raiding
in the reports of the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan frontier officers. There was, indeed, no lack of
complaint by the authorities on both sides of the attitude of their opposite
numbers across the frontier. As usual, there appeared to be more substance in
the complaints from Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , which need not be enumerated, but which may
be put down to two main causes.
19 Early in the year the Saudi Government created three new posts close
to the Hejaz- Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan frontier at Haql on the coast, Alqan between the coast
and the track of the Hejaz Railway, and Dhat-al-Hajj on that track. These
were at first directly dependent on the new Saudi preventive administration in
Mecca (see paragraph 175 of the report for 1934). They would appear to have
been later transferred to the local governors. The excess of zeal and misconduct
of the garrisons at Alqan and to some extent Haql led to incidents in the frontier
area soon after their creation and again in the autumn. The other main cause
of trouble was the maintenance in the governorate of Kaf of that very truculent
person Salih-bin-Abdul-Wahid, the author of many pin-pricks. It was hoped
that, when he went on leave in April, he would not return. He was, however, sent
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