'Monograph on the Aden Hinterland as touching the States of Dthala, Yafa', Alawi, etc., by Major H F Jacob, late Political Agent, Dthala.' [‎13v] (31/48)

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the exclusion of Kotaibi could not possibly have existed. If indeed the Alawi
was able at that time to purchase certain rights in that village, the Kotaibi
who ruled the Habilen, including the village of Ath Thumair, and had his own
Customs on the Habilen, must have exercised equal rights with the other, and
probably his jurisdiction was superior, on the principle that might is
right.
41. We have now left the Hinterland. The difficulty I had with the
Alawi is already known to Government. The facts of the road at this time are
as follows :—Hardaba Fort and Suleik Fort are destroyed and the Kotaibis are
in possession of both places, and their jurisdiction extends north of Hardaba
some mile up the river bed to a place called “ Safa Hiliya ” where the
Amir’s jurisdiction starts Northwards. Far al Qabtan {alias Far al Hamrah)
is also demolished. It stood opposite to Ath Thumair village and during the
chronic inter-tribal disputes has been for two years used by Alawi to light his
battles. I had strongly recommended its demolition, lor on our departure it
would in Alaw i hands have given rise to daily fighting. Far Ta iz which the
Kotaibi lately erected on the hill opposite to, and commanding, both Ath
Thumair and Far al Qabtan, was also demolished under my surpervision.
This the Kotaibis called * Dar Al Megar ’ after me and in opposition to the
Alawi Fort which bore the late Captain Warneford’s name. The idea was to
leave Kotaibi with Alawi as co-adjutors in the custody of the road in that
vicinity, and the agreements lately sanctioned would have effected this. As
explained elsewhere there was at Lahej a Farbar presided over by me, and
attended by the Abdali Sultan, the Amir of Fthala, the Kotaibi and
Alawi Chiefs and many chosen Saiyids. Here the Alawi Sheikh
agreed to my demolishing his fort of Far al Qabtan, but went back
on his word when I arrived at the spot, and blankly refused his assent unless
the Fs. 500 promised him in the treaty (for demolition of this fort and the
construction of another at Ma’baja) had been first paid over to him. This
unfriendly attitude and the overt hostility of his people and mercenaries lias
been explained elsewhere. Owing to Ramadthan, primarily, and to the voile
face executed by the Alaw'i Sheikh, the agreements are still waiting signature.
The Haushabi Sultan and Kotaibi Sheik will, I believe, come into Aden; the
Alawi’s attitude merits serious notice as my life was endangered and the safety
of the pafty with me was at one time imperilled. At the same tirne^ it
would never do to let the Kotaibi sign bis agreement and remain in possession
of a certain portion of the road with the Alawi Sheikh unwilling to fulfil his
obligations alongside. It would mean the effacement of Sheikh Ali’s authority
and a predominance of Kotaibi influence along the whole Habilen. In other
words we should, mutatis mutandis, have the unsatisfactory conditions formerly
in vogue, where then, it was the Alawi in the ascendant and using his
opponent’s weakness for self-aggrandisement.
There will never he complete rest on that plateau, but chronic impediment
to trade, until the inter-tribal disputes of these tw'O people are settled, as
promised by the Abdali Sultan. Tiie pacification will even then be one*sided
and unsatisfactory unless Alawi and Kotaibi clansmen are equally strong on the
plateau, with their respective bounds settled, as indeed they were before me at
the Lahej conference.
The actual wording of the new r agreements contains no mention of bounds,
but this is a sine qua non. We cannot arm the Kotaibi and give him a
stipend without assigning him a terrain for the exercise of his responsibilities.
Otherwise we shall at once open the door to strife. The Kotaibi w T e found on
the entire plateau and we recognised his position there though w T e did not
investigate his credentials. There was at that time no need for it and still less
need later wTien he llouted us ai;d was driven back into his hills. Now
re-admitted into the circle of our friendship he is coming back to ground which
for the time being we peimitted the Alawi to hold. Ergo, we cannot let the two
parties fight it out, but are duty bound, as we make them co-ordinate road custo
dians to assign to each his several bounds. I have already so assigned these limits
and both parties were agreeable. Owing to the break in the overtures, and
our departure, we cannot do better than ask the Abdali Sultan to resume the