Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎100r] (203/312)

3^^ Ti^SD 6 C ^
LONDON, MONDA Y, OCT. 7.
A telegram from our Special Correspondent at
Simla announces that the Viceroy's emissary left
Cabul on the 2Sth nit., having been detained by
the Ameer to bring an answer to the Viceroy's
letters. It was reported that the Ameer is greatly
surprised at our sudden anger at his treatment of
the mission, previous rebuffs having been
borne in silence. He was also said to
be strengthening his forces at v Candahar,
Jellalabad, and Ali Musjid. On the 4th inst. a
large portion of the Peshawur garrison moved
to Jumrood, the object being, however, kept
secret. The Government considers It highly im
probable that the Ameer will humble himself or
agree to our terms, without which, our Correspon
dent says, no apology will be accepted. By the 1st
of November Quetta will be reinforced, and an
advance on Candahar and the Koorum Valley is
,| certain. ■ ^. n miM i^~ ——
A ccording to the report'which wo receive from
our Correspondent at Simla, her M ajesty's
Ministers could not have had much fresh material
on which to form a decision at the Cabinet
Council of Saturday. There is still an impression
at Simla that the A meer may repudiate the act
of his commandant, but we are warned significantly
that the authorities do not consider it probable
that he will humble himselt and accept the terms
they would impose upon hira. No apology, it is
, believed, would be accepted without some such
coinpl^e^ BubuiisiiAyi*- VVa should indeed be'
i greatly surprised if it turned out that the
| policy of the P rime M inister and the
Indian V iceroy had no other object than that
of teaching the A meer a lesson in politeness. We
greatly doubt whether Lord B eaconsitei/d feels
deeply wounded in spirit by the fact that the'
A meer declined to receive the visit of our Envoy,
or would be perfectly satisfied if S here A li said
he had made a mistake and was willing to
apologise for it. We know that the annexation
of Scinde was resolved on by our Indian autho
rities whether the Ameers of that day made
acknowledgment of their shortcomings or not;
i and the annexation of Scinde was accepted,
i although every member of the English Cabinet ,
i would gladly have opposed it if there were any j
i way of undoing what had been done. The j
purpose of the Government in their present j
policy is, we may be sure, far too ambitious
to be satisfied with S here A li's saying—what .•
Dr. J ohnson declared the utmost any gentleman
should be asked to say—that he was sorry if he had
given offence. Nor, we must add, does it seem by |
any means probable that the A meer would, with- I
out trying the issue farther, make such a submis- j
sion as the Indian Government would consider |
satisfactory. Our Correspondent mentions the |
report that S here A li ia greatly surprised at our j
sudden anger because of the manner in which our i
mission has been treated. We had borne previous
rebuffs in quiet, he is reported to argue, and why
should we not bear this ? His reasoning, if it be
his, would be plausible enough if it were
merely a question of politeness. If a man is
habitually discourteous and his neighbour has
often put up with his rudeness, there
seems no particular reason why the neighbour
should furiously resent on Saturday what he had
passed over with apathy or contempt on each pre
ceding day of the week. But S here A li is
doubtless well convinced for his part that the
English Government have some other purpose
than that of teaching him good manners. Lady
S ale and other witnesses have told that when
A ttra - h K han , son of D ost M ohammed , was j
{ busying himself to save the English prisoners from
the fury of his own followers, some .of the latter
I gravely remonstrated with him. " We told your
" father," they said, "when B urnes came here,
" that if he allowed him to return B urnes would
" come back with an army to take our country
" from us!" This is what S here A h doubfc-
i less expects—an .army to take his country from
him.
This is, beyond question, what some of our :
statesmen and their advisers have been con
templating all along. To this, no doubt, it may
possibly come in the end. The wish for delay
which seems to possess so many is probably in some
cases at least, the result of a conviction that
the longer decisive measures are postponed the
more comprehensive they must be in the end.
This is one of the reasons why we have urged
i that our action should be instantaneous. We
have shown more than once that an immediate
movement could be made with complete
success in a military sense. Such a course
would secure for England ail the effect
which we really'ought to consider legiti
mate—that of showing to^India and the East
generally that we are not to be insulted with
impunity. So far as the Ameer and the
Afghans are concerned, it matters little to us
whether S here A li is rough or polished—
whether he shuts his door like the rude Carin-
thian boor, or keeps it open in perpetual hospi
tality like the good A xyltjs in Homer.
What we cannot afford, for the sake of India as
well as ourselves, is to have it believed all over
the East that the deliberate purpose and policy of
our Government could be frustrated by a word
of command from an Afghan prince. Whether
: S here A li is supposed to stand alone
or to have powerful backers, the effect
upon our influence in the East Would be
deplorable if we allowed it to go abroad
that he had insulted us with impunity. The
policy of the Government has unfortunately left
the English people with little or no choice as to that
point. Nine out of every ten men might have said
a month ago that it would be better not to send
1 any mission unless we knew it would be received.
But not one man in ten now probably would say
that, the mission having been sent, and having
been turned back, we can afford to let the matter
drop and leave S here A li to the censure of the
polite world. The great difficulty is, however,
that we cannot assume the Government to have
no further purpose in their minds than the mere
1 bringing of S here A li to his senses. This move
ment, we have been told again and again,
is part of a great scheme of Impe
rial policy; and no great scheme of
Imperial policy can include the teaching of
politeness and respect for the laws of hospitality
to all the independent rulers of the East. It can 1
hardly be doubted that the A mber regards all
this later policy as levelled against his indepen
dence. The course he has taken to resist the
attempt is singularly ill-chosen. Whether it be his
own device or comes of the .prompting of others,
it has had the effect of giving plausible excuse for
an enterprise that otherwise might have been
morally impossible. It has done more: it has
rendered it difficult even for a statesmanship of
greater moderation and higher moral principle
than we now see in power to say that that move- -
ment once set on foot shall stop at any particular
line of limitation.
So far as the English public in gdneral are con
cerned, we do not however see the slightest gleam
of evidence to show that there is any particular
sympathy with the enterprise which the Govern
ment are believed to be undertaking. We are
willing to leave out of consideration altogether,
for the moment, the very large proportion of
Englishmen who are opposed to the policy- which
would seek an occasion for war with S here A li.
We leave out of consideration, too, the numbers
who are opposed to any kind of war which
is not strictly defensive. Of the former, it would
be said by supporters of the Government that
they judge of this particular enterprise from the
wrong point of view; of the latter, that they judge
of all warlike enterprise from the same point
of view. But, even among the classes who
gave to the Government during the sitting of
Parliament a support that was,, like the daughter
of C haos , " laborious, heavy, busy, bold, and
" blind"—even among those there is no
enthusiasm about the invasion of Afghanistan.
There is no glory to be gained by it, and there is
no additional security to our Indian Empire to
j come of it. Of the immediate result in a military
sense there can hardly be any doubt. We are in
finitely better armed now than we were in the
1 beginning of the reign, and we have the blunders
then made as warnings to keep us out of mistakes
now. But even then we were always able
to hold our own in arms against any force
Afghanistan could bring against us, and we were
sure of complete victory in the end. It was
not a military difficulty which in any way embar
rassed us. The most ardent lover of martial glory
can find nothing, therefore, to gratify his passion
in a military occupation of Cabul. In point of
fact, not one Englishman in ten thousand cares a
straw for such a demonstration of our power.
Nor is there the faintest popular anxiety to have