Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎62v] (128/312)

THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK OF THE AFGHAN WAR.
A few days since we insisted that it would be a disgrace and a wrong if
India is made to pay for a war which, if it comes, will be nothing less than
a war against Russia on the Indian border; and not only so, but a war
springing immediately from the gross mismanagement of the Eastern Question
here in London. We might have added, and ought to have added, that India
cannot pay for such a war, rightly or wrongly, without absolute financial
collapse. To-day Mr. Fawcett treats of this subject in a letter to the
' Daily News, which, though written very temperately, is a most forcible
one. In the first place, he cites the opinion of Lord Lawrence
that whereas the former war in Afghanistan cost us thirteen millions,
to make another war safe a much greater expenditure must be faced.
" The cost would inevitably prove enormous." And such is the
financial condition of India at the present time that by such a war
"a fatal blow would be given to the already over-burdened finances
of India." Further taxation is impracticable. Two successive Governors-
General have emphatically declared that to impose additional taxation in
India will " produce the most serious discontent," and " is a political
danger the magnitude of which can scarcely be exaggerated." Mr. Fawcett
then argues that by the Government of India Act, 1858, it is decreed that,
" except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of her Majesty's Indian
possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the revenues of
India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be appli
cable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond
the external frontiers of such possessions by her Majesty's forces charged
upon such revenues." And Mr. Fawcett argues, and all India can fairly
follow him, that this is not a case of actual invasion and sudden emergency ;
and that Afghanistan is beyond the external frontier of her Majesty's
Indian possessions. Further, Mr. Fawcett reminds the country that—
When the Government of India Bill was passing through Parliament Lord Derby
distinctly stated that if Indian troops were employed with Imperial objects the charge
should be borne by England ; and if for Indian obj ects, the charge should be borne by
India. It has been affirmed by the Governor-General of India that before leaving
England he agreed with the present Government to treat Afghan affairs not simply as
an Indian question, but in accordance with a scheme of Imperial policy; and this view
of the matter was endorsed last year by the Minister representing India in the House of
Commons, who declared that our frontier policy in India is "mainly dependent for its
solution on the policy of her Majesty's Government."
Nor can any reasonable man, not a Government official or a ministerial
partisan, for a moment doubt that this last sentence precisely describes
the situation. Upon all this Mr. Fawcett maintains that it would be as
unjust as it would be impolitic to make the Indian people bear the cost of
the war which now appears inevitable. That this is our own opinion we
have already said. To burden India with the cost of this war would be a
wrong df which every Englishman should be ashamed ; and it is one that
would inevitably bring its own punishment: and that a heavy one.
ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND AFGHANISTAN.
The Calcutta correspondent of the Times, telegraphing yesterday, says that
public interest, both European and native, is concentrated on the critical state
of affairs upon our North-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. . The Government will make Lahore
their head-quarters for the coming winter, and will not return to Calcutta,
and the Foreign Office has received orders to form a camp at Lahore. This,
the correspondent says, looks as if the Viceroy entertained no hopes of peace.
He continues
The Commander-in-Chief is energetically engaged in massing the forces required for
the separate commands and in strenuously pushing forward the commissariat, siege train,
and other military preparations. It is well to remember, however, in order to avoid
misconceptions as to the possibility of immediate results, that an Afghan campaign cannot
in any circumstances resolve itself into a military promenade. That the Ameer, be his
resistance ever so determined, must in the end succumb to the force brought against him
1 the authorities entertain no shadow of doubt; but, in order to achieve uninterrupted success—
I for we cannot afford to run the slightest risk of even the appearance of a momentary
; check—the whole campaign must be carefully and deliberately planned beforehand, and a
successful issue rendered absolutely certain by the consolidation of large military reserves.
Accurate information as to the Ameer's actual strength is wanting ; but it is well
known that in addition to irregular levies, who form a fighting material by no means
to be despised, he also possesses a standing army, drilled and disciplined after European
models, and well equipped with the very rifles and other arms with which former i
Governments in India were wise and generous enough to provide him. This, how
ever, is a condition of things which the Government will have little difficulty in
measuring and adequately dealing with. A very much more difficult question
has to be encountered in the possible hostile attitude of the border tribes.
All the mountain passes leading down from the Cabul highlands to the Indus
Valley are in the possession of these Pathan mountaineers, some of whom, like :
the Khyberees, owe direct allegiance to the Ameer, and all of whom are animated |
by a hatred of ourselves more or less active in character. Now, the faintest mistake in
tactics or error of judgm< nt might excite into a blaze of warfare, raging along our whole ;
frontier of 8co miles, the suspended hostility of these various tribes. The consequences
of this state of things would be that we should be forced to carry on an arduous moun
tain campaign with a formidable opponent, while engaged on all sil«s in a guerrilla
warfare of a most harassing and exhausting description. It has been estimated :
that these tribes can easily turn out 100,000 fighting men, and even in time of;
I peace the Government are forced to secure the frontier from their periodic \
irruptions by a chain of about twenty forts and ninety small military stations, held Ij
and garrisoned by some 25,000 troops and over 10,000 military police. A successful
intrigue or effectual pressure by the Ameer might convert all these tribes into active con
federate allies, more especially if he could hold out prospects of successful raids on
Indian territory, and so excite their greed for plunder and lust for revenge for past reverses
suffered at the hands of the English. This is the special danger which the Government
has now to guard against, and which requires that great circumspection and deliberation
should be used ; but though it is an argument for delay, it is a greater argument still that
this state of things should, once for all, cease to exist, and we may thank the Ameer, and more
especially Russia as the causa causans, for affording us this opportunity of consolidating
the defences of our Indian Empire by a strategic and military rectification of our frontier.
"We are now furnished with the most ample justification, in the conduct of Russia herself,
for taking such immediate action as will be pregnant in the future with lasting results,
and so guarding against all disastrous consequences which otherwise might have
flowed from her systematized intrigue and aggressive movements in Central Asia
and her present threatened interference at the very threshold of India. We have
been now driven into what will probably be a costly war entirely against our
will and all our endeavours to avoid it. This occasion, therefore, will now be seized
in order to secure for ourselves the various passes piercing the mountain ranges along the
whole frontier from the Khyber to the Bolan* and further strategic measures will be
adopted to dominate entirely the Suliman range and the Hindoo Koosh. These hostile
steps are still dependent on the conduct of the Ameer. The Govermnent are anxious to
avoid acting harshly, and will still allow him locus penitentuE prior to commencing
active hostilities. In any event, I doubt whether the attempt to invade Afghanistan on a
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