File E/8 I Ibn Sa‘ud [‎193r] (408/606)

CONFIDENTIAL.
Dated the 26th June 1914.
From— C aptain W. H. I. S hakespear,
To— S ir A rthur H irtzel, K. C. B., Secretary, Political Department India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
London.
I have been through the papers which you were good enough to have sent to me and
apparently some of the information which I sent to the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. at Bushire from Riadh
has never reached Government—the reason may be that, as I wrote to Mr. Lorimer privately,
the letter may have been destroyed on reaching Bushire some six weeks cifter his death.
♦
I reached Riadh on the 9th March and found active preparations being made for the
collection of a large force by Bin Saud ; I stayed and travelled with Bin Saud until the 15th and
during this time had many opportunities of ascertaining his feelings and intentions. I would
add that being on exceptionally intimate terms with Abdul Aziz and his whole family he fre
quently showed me the confidential correspond-
* Vide Foreign Secretary's note above. ence passing between him and other Arab*
Chiefs, amongst them Sayid Mahomed al-Idrisi,
the Imam Yahyah of Sana'a Bin Sha'alan, the premier sh-tikh of the great Anaize.h tribe and
others of lesser impoitance, as well a > his communications with the Turkish authorities. I
did my best to discourage his confidences seeing that I had no official status, but as he
insisted they may now be useful.
Bin Saud was aware of the advent of Turkish troops and the new Vali of Basrah, Suliman
Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , in Riadh before I met him in March, and fearing that the troops were intended for a des
cent on Katif, Ojair and Hasa he had issued orders for a general mobilization of his troops {i.e.,
townsmen and villagers as distinct from the nomad Bedouin, who do not count for much).
This mobilization only called up a small proportion of the available fighting strength of each
village—some 30 per cent, was my estimate after many enquiries—but even then Bin Saud had
anything from 5,000 to 7,000 well-armed and mounted men ready to his hand. The military
efficiency of Bin Saud's arrangements will be realized when it is understood that some of the
villages are nearly 150 miles from Riadh, that the mobilization was practically complete within
a fortnight, and that 1,000 men were despatched and posted in the coast villages (particularly
Katif) within the first week.
Bin Saud told me that he w^s forced to make these preparations as he could not risk allow
ing the Turkish troops to effect a landing on the coast unopposed. He intended no aggressive
action but was determined on a vigorous defence. He was exceedingly anxious as to wha&
reply* he would receive from the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. ,
* Reply is at Sub-Enclosure No. 2 in Serial No. Pobrom to his lettert of the 1st Babi-ath-Thani 1332
(51). Also Sub-Enclosure in Serial No. (60). Wiiam, ^ ^ 26th February iou
+ Sub-Enclosure No. 1 in Serial No. (51). and what steps, if any, would be taken by His
Majesty's Government in the event of the..
Turkish troops making for the coast. My position did not permit of more than
counselling patience, deprecating any hostile movement and suggesting that in any negotiations
which might be attempted he should be careful
t Vide Sub-Unelosures and Enclosure to Serial reme tuber that he had given us (when he met J
No- (37). Major Trevor and myself at Ojair in December)
certain provisional assurances regarding the Trucial Chiefs and British traders on the coast.
He said he had no intention of committing himself definitely to the Turks so long as he had any
chance of arriving at an arrangement w^th the British Government or at least of obtaining our
support or good offices in his negotiations with the Turks, but at the same time he could not
wait indefinitely and continue to maintain p large force in the field ; and, unless he could obtain
some sort of assurance he would be compelled to make his own arrangements in order to obtain
a temporary respite at least from having to remain continually on guard. He told me then that
the two conditions upon which the Turks would certainly insist would be the re-establish
ment of their former garrisons, and (b) the exclusion of all foreigners ; the former he would
never agree to whatever happened, and thought that by accepting the latter he might be able
to buy his desired respite, though he saw that such acceptance would probably close the door
to any further negotiations with the British Government, much as he desired an understanding
witn them. The reports of the subsequent negotiations in April near Kuwait show that Bin
Saud has not wavered in his resolve, nor do I think that he will so long as he can fence
with the Turks, and continues to cling to his hope of drawing His Majesty's Government
into any arrangement which he may make with the Porte.