File E/8 I Ibn Sa‘ud [‎125v] (265/606)

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greatly surprised at the terms of the latter three, especially 4 and 5, and, it
the information proved to be correct, should feel constrained o procesc
strongly against them.
The only explanation of such conditions would appear to be that the
Porte mistrust the assurances already offered of our readiness to co-opera e,
and that they fail to appreciate the difficulties in which we are placed by t le
continuance of the present unsatisfactory state oi affairs between themselves
and Bin Saud.
We fully recognise that Kejd is an Ottoman province, and have no desire
to interfere in it, but for the reasons already given we cannot ignore Bin baud
bow that he is in occupation of the coast-line. There is no secret regarding our
requirements. What we require of him, for the maintenance and protection
of our interests, is—
1. That he should not meddle in the territory or polities of Arab prin
cipalities in the Gulf, including Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. and Katar,
2. That like other Shaikhs on the Arab side of the Gulf he should co
operate for the observation and maintenance of the maritime truce ; the
suppression of piracy and the pursuit of inter-tribal hostilities by the passage
of armed dhows at sea.
3. That he should co-operate for the suppression of the arms traffic.
4. That British traders should be freely admitted to Katif, and properly
treated while there.
There is nothing in these conditions to which either Bin Saud or the Porte
can take the least legitimate objection; at the same time it is only natural
that while expressing his readiness to accept the obligations involved, Bin
Saud should in return desire the friendly offices of the British Government in
the composition of his quarrel with the Turkish authorities and should ask us to
deter Shaikhs in relations with us from harbouring tribal enemies of his.
We had no wish to intrude ourselves, but the terms of the conditions
which, as we hear, the Porte now seek to impose on Bin Saud, show so little
friendliness toward ourselves, and are so impossible of acquiescence, that we
are obliged to return to the subject.
We are primarily concerned to see the last three conditions withdrawn,
but we should also be glad to see a satisfactory arrangement come to with
Bin Saud by the Porte, under which as a corollary of their decision to regard
Bin Saud as ex officio Mutessarif of El Hassa, they should approve and take
cognisance of his undertaking to comply locally with our four desiderata
above detailed, and, while reserving the right to take in the last resort
whatever action they may deem necessary, should, by way of friendly co-opera
tion with the British Government for the preservation of* peace and good order
in the Gulf, agree to refrain from hostile action by sea against the El Hassa
coast, without first consulting us, and giving us an opportunity of friendly
mediation if such be possible.
Foreign Office, 9th March 1914,