'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎64v] (133/424)

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employed in turning the enemy's left flank, in conjunction with a frontal
attack which was to be made on the trenches that stood on and near the-
left bank of the Tigris. At the same time General Kemball was to take^
command of the 28th Infantry Brigade, 92nd Punjabis, one company of:
the i28th Pioneers, the 28th Field Battery, and two sections of the 23rd
Mountain Battery and, as soon as General Younghusband's troops were-
in position for the delivery of the turning attack, Kemball's force was to-
make a vigorous advance in co-operation with the Cavalry Brigade. The
9th Infantry Brigade and the Provisional Battalion would be in reserve-
on the right bank; and the 62nd Punjabis, who had just come up, the
72nd and 77th Heavy Batteries, one section of the 104th Heavy Battery
and the 13th Sappers and Miners would be under the orders of the Corps
Commander on the left bank. Eeports were to be sent to the northern
end of the bridge.
On receipt of these instructions General Younghusband sent for his^
brigadiers and artillery commanders to whom the plan of action was-
explained at 1100. It was proposed that the attack should commence
at noon, when the 19th Infantry Brigade (less the 92nd, and also two-
companies of the 28th which had been sent to the 35th Infantry Brigade),
was to advance on the right of the 35th Infantry Brigade, and sweeping,
round was to roll up the enemy's left flank in co-operation with the 16th«
Cavalry working on the right. As progress was made by the 19th Brigade,
the 35th would co-operate by delivering an attack during which its left
was to rest on the bank of the Tigris. The artillery would support both
attacks from positions about a mile to the noith-west of the bridge, and
the 21st Infantry Brigade would follow behind the centre of the group
as the reserve.
The dispositions that had been indicated by General Younghusband
may have been those best adapted to the situation, for, as has been pointed
out, it does not appear that the positions of the enemy's trenches had
been accurately located owing to the prevalence of haze and mirage and
other causes; and the fact of coming under fire, and the direction from
which the fire was delivered, were generally the first indications of the
presence of the Turks.- But the arrangements were hardly in accordance-
with either the letter or spirit of the orders that had been issued by Gene
ral Aylmer. It was indeed afterwards found that the Turkish front line
extended for more than three miles from the Tigris, and that this line-
was connected with other entrenchments, which had been constructed
for the use of supports and reserves, by a number of well made commu
nication trenches. A series of trenches thrown forward at some distance
from the left of the first line so as to flank it had also been commenced ;
and, in addition, a third position had been prepared from three to five-
miles behind the Turkish left, where resistance could be offered to any-
British attempts at envelopment.