'Administration Reports 1920-1924' [‎128r] (260/412)

PERSIAN GULF The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. POLITICAL RESIDENCY An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. , 1923.
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(2) Strengthening of Military forces in the South. —As a preliminary to tli©
extension of military power over the tribes in the South, also incidentally as an
argument in favour of the reduction of the British Military Garrison in Bushire,
the Persian Military Forces were increased early in the year by the arrival of
about 100 regulars from Shiraz. Subsequently the Amnieh tufangchis on the
Bushire-Shiraz road were dismissed and the protection of the road was handed
over to the military authorities who placed several small detachments on the road.
The local forces were strengthened from time to time and detachments were sent
out to outlying ports and places in the Hinterland ; so that by August 1st, 1923,
and December 31st, 1923, their disposition was roughly estimated to be as fol
lows :—
August 1st 1923 December 31st 1923.
Busliire .. .. .. 100 men .. 100 men.
Borasjun .. .. .. 100 „ .. 100 „
Behbehan .. .. " 80 to 100 „ .. 80 to 100 „
Dilwar .. .. .. 10 „ .. 10 „
Lingah .. .. .. .. .. 60
Dashti .. .. .. ,. .. 400 „
Dilum .. .. .. .. .. 15 „
The forces in Bushire were kept up to the mark by occasional inspections.
Sarhang Saifullah Khan from the Shiraz brigade visited Bushire for a month in
the spring : and Mohammed Taqi Khan, Officer Commanding the Shiraz Brigade,
carried out an inspection of the local forces in the early autumn.
The discipline and morale of these troops seem to be good. They are at any
rate well informed, fairly punctually paid and are not only taking themselves
seriously but are taken seriously by everybody. It can be readily imagined that
this sudden appearance in the South of a national army in being, on however mod
est a scale, works a profound change in the whole situation of affairs in this part
of Persia ; and there can be no doubt that the little army here commands the
situation. One may doubt the wisdom of the policy of sending out small detach
ments such as the party at Dilwar whose object is to check smuggling into the
interior (particularly of arms and ammunition), but at all events it is a sign that
the Persian military department is alert to control affairs and to make its presence
felt everywhere. There can be no doubt as to the success of the army in keeping
order on the main road to Shiraz. A state of good order and of confidence reigns
all along the road to the immense benefit of trade and to a degree which has
not been known in modern times. Nor is it possible to question the generally
tranquilizing effect which the presence of these troops has already had in the
Hinterland. When Zair Khidar Khan, the notorious chief of Thangistan, was
murdered along with his younger son in April, civil war and disturbance on a
considerable scale might easily have come about. A detachment of over 100 men
were at once sent out from Bushire to keep order in the district and arrest, if
possible, the murderers, and they were able to return in a month after having
prevented any outbreak of real disorder in the tribe. Towards the end of the
year a considerable force of about 600 infantry with 4 machine guns, 100 cavalry
and 30 artillery with 2 mountain guns arrived in Bushire from Shiraz, with the
object of collecting revenue from Dashti and Dashtistan, and generally asserting
a moral ascendency over the tribes possibly also of disarming them. The heavy
rains of December prevented them from doing anything very decided before the
close of the year. The success of this expedition therefore remains to.be seen.
The influence which the Military have thus been able to exert on the local situa
tion has of course, profoundly weakened the power of the local Khans. They
now stand or fall as they are supported or not by the army. Thus Ghazanfar-
es-'Saltaneh the Zabit of Borasjun, lately a power in the land, was in the autumn
pressed by the Military to increase his revenue from 6,000 to 10,000 tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. (to^
swell the Military budget). His protests resulted in his immediate replacement
by his nephew Atha Khan (formely known as pro-British) who with the help of
Shaikh Mohammed oi* Chakutah (equally known as anti-British) found the requir
ed amount. The same method if applied to other Khans—and its success in this
case promises that it may be—-must result in the ruin or disappearance of the
Khans. Whether this break up of the tribal system will be a good thing or a bad
thing for Persia is beside the point. It is in process of being accomplished and
is the deliberate object of the Army Command. This shufflmg of the cards has
the further effect, seen in the Borasjun case where our late friends and enemies
are brought into the same camp, of eliminating what little there remains of
British influence upon tribal affairs in the Bushire Hinterland.