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Astara are not so likely except in the case of a hostile land advance from Caucasia
into Azerbaijan, when such descents might be made to protect the eastern flank of
the invaders. The provinces of Mazanderan, Ghilan and Astrabad are among the
most fertile of Persia, and their possession might well form the objective of hostile
descents on the southern shore of the Caspian. The strength of the invading force
w’ ould depend mainly on the shipping available on the Caspian. In the event of the
whole of the former Russian territory being controlled by one State, 10,000 to 15,000
men with modern equipment might be disembarked at any one of the localities named.
6 . North-IYest Frontier .—The danger to Persia on this side again depends on
the future of the self-constituted States which have been formed in Caucasia. If
they remain independent the danger from them to Persia will be small, though the
desire of the Azerbaijan State to draw to itself Persian Azerbaijan will probably
always exist, and would be encouraged if the Persian forces and the arrangements
of Persia for protecting her territory were not adequate. If Caucasia should again
be united to a larger Russian State, the danger of invasion on this side by large and
well-equipped forces will again become a live one. The first objective of a hostile
advance from the north in this area would probably be Tabriz, on which the main
column would be directed. The main column might be assisted by the advance of
other columns further east, and possibly also by descents on the coast.
7. Western Frontier .—The conditions on the Western frontier of Persia will
depend a good deal on the nature of the future Government of Asia Minor. It is
improbable that Turkey will be again able to present to Persia’s Western frontiers
the menace of a great Power, but it will probably be some time before the Kurdish
tribes lying in this region will be sufficiently dominated by the future Asia Minor
Government to cease to be an anxiety to the Persian Government, This anxiety
should, however, be gradually lessened, and as the Government of Asia Minor becomes
consolidated Persia will be able to call on that Government to prevent their Kurds
entering Persian territory. For some time to come, however, Persia’s forces in this
region should be capable of dealing with incursions of Kurdish bands, which might
amount to a strength of 2,000 well-armed men. Such bands would be mobile, and
would probably receive assistance from Kurdish Persian subnects inside Persia’s
border.
8 . General .—Speaking generally, Persia’s main external danger lies on the
north, and the extent of this danger in the future will depend greatly on what form
the territories constituting the previous Russian Empire take, as the result of the
revolution. The best hope for Persia is that the result will be that she will be
bordered on the north by a series of small independent States. The protection of
her frontiers will then be a task well within the capacity of the army which Persia
can hope to raise in the immediate future. On the other hand, the menace of a great
and united Power such as the old Russian Empire is one that could only be adequately
met by the creation of a large army, capable of expansion by means of an efficient
system of reserves. Such an army is beyond the capacity of the country in the
immediate future, though it need not be so later on if Persia takes advantage of her
latent resources and the inherent capacity for development which she undoubtedly
possesses. Until such development takes place, bringing into the realms of possibility
the creation of a large army capable of withstanding any menace, Persia’s best hope
for protection from considerable external dangers lies in an alliance with such Powers
as she feels she can rely on the friendship of, and who have a disinterested desire for,
her advancement.
Persia has been favoured by nature with topographical features on her frontiers
which favour defence from external aggression. This is particularly so on the
North-East, the North-West, and on the West. Mountain ranges confine generally
avenues of advance to well-defined routes. It must, however, be remembered that
no country can rely on mountains, rivers, or the stones of fortresses to protect its
borders; a country’s only reliable defence lies in the hearts of its citizens and their
determination to accept any sacrifice that may be needed for the defence of their
native land.
(B.) The Internal Dangers.
9. General .—The most serious military problem to be dealt with in Persia is
that of the internal security of the country. This is due to the large number of well-
armed wandering tribes who inhabit different parts of the country, who refuse to
settle down into regular pastoral or agricultural pursuits, and who live largely by
[3639] B 2