أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [و‎‎٢‎٩] (١٧٦/٥٧)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.] •
No. 1 seorktary of state.
EGYPT AND SOUDAN
[February 8.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
$ECTTO> 1 .
[E 1623/10/16] No. 1.
Record of a Discussion with Mr. Ben Spoor and Mr. E. D. Morel.
ON the *8th February Mr. McNeill received at the Foreign Office Mr. Ben
Spoor. M.F. and Mr. E. D. Morel, M.T., who had a?ked for an interview in order
to discuss the situation in Egypt. Mr. Murray and Mr. Cooper were also present.
Mr. SPOOR, who mentioned that he was himself leaving for Egypt on the
following day for the benefit of his health, said that they had no specific proposal
to put forward, but that they wished to enquire whether it was not possible at the
present time to effect a reconciliation between the different parties in Egypt and to
abandon the policy of repression which had been proved to be unsuccessful.
Mr. MOREL said that the Labour Party did not regard Egypt as a party
question. They onlv desired to discover a solution of the present anomalous position
in which martial law remained in force although the independence of Egypt had been
recognised. There was a widespread feeling in Egypt that there was a general
consensus of opinion in favour of a more liberal policy and that His Majesty s
Government were not ill-disposed, but that the stumbling block in the way of progress
was His Majesty’s High Commissioner. In the subsequent course of the conversation
he returned repeatedly to this point and added that, according to the information
which reached him. Lord Allenby had at first been extremely liberal-minded, but had
lately come under other influences which had entirely altered his point of view. The
two changes which Mr. Morel wished to see in Egypt were the abolition of martial
law and the return of Zaghlul.
Mr. McNEILL said that he was not in a position to speak with any authority,
and that for this reason he had at first hesitated to grant the interview. He could
however, assure Mr. Morel that he was mistaken with regard to the attitude of
Lord Allenby, who was most liberal-minded and who was more anxious than anybody
t 0 see the situation regularised and martial law abolished. This, however, could not
come about until the Constitution had been promulgated. In Ireland the mistake
had been made of handing over the control of the country to the Free State
Government before the necessary machinery existed that should have enabled that
Government to deal with the situation. It was not desired to make a similar mistake
in Egypt. The delay with regard to the promulgation of the Constitution wns not
the fault of His Majesty’s Government nor of Lord Allenby. Neither they nor he
had intervened in any way in the drafting of the Constitution, except when an
attempt had been made under cover of the terms of the Constitution to prejudice one
of the four reserved subjects, i.e., the question of the Soudan. The Egyptians were
themselves responsible for the delays that had occurred. The King would prefer a
Constitution of an 18th century type, and it was a difference of opinion on this
subject that had led to the resignation of Sarwat.
With regard to the return of Zaghlul, this again must await the coming into
force of the Constitution. In reply to a question by Mr. Morel, who said that he
was informed that the King had lately become convinced of the necessity of Zaghlul’s
return, Mr. McNeill said that if, when the Constitution was in force the King and
the Prime Minister wished to recall Zaghlul, he did not consider it likely that either
His Majesty’s Government or Lord Allenby would have any objection.
Mr. MOREL then asked what the attitude of His Majesty’s Government would
be if the King said that he could not draw up a Constitution until Zaghlul returned
to assist him in the task. Mr. McNeill replied that if such a plea were put forward
he thought that His Majesty’s Government would say that it was untrue. A
Constitution could perfectly well come into force without the assistance of Zaghlul,
whose presence would be much more likely to prove a hindrance than a help. So long
as Great Britain were responsible for maintaining order under martial law, he did
not consider that the return of Zaghlul should be permitted. Once the Constitution
was in force it would be another matter.
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