أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [و‎‎٢‎٨] (١٧٦/٥٥)

2*
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government, j
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Printed jor the Committee of Imperial Defence. November tt923.
MOST SECRET.
irV
466-B.
u ‘i-puriul LhtfQn&
^ v«naii Gardens, 8.W.
t i
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
MILITARY POLICY IN EGYPT AND DEFENCE OF SUEZ CANAL.
(Previous C.I.D. Papers Nos. 438—R, 439—R, 446—/J, 418—R, 450—R, 453—R, 454—R,
457-R, 462-R and Minutes of liCith Meeting.)
Copy of Letter from the Admiralty to the Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.
M /P.D. 01869/23. Admiralty, S. W. 1,
gj rj November 17, 1923. i
I AM commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit 1
herewith, for the information of the Committee of Imperial Defence, a copy of a letter
which has been received from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, regarding the
Naval Staff Paper (D.O.P. 15*) entitled “ Liability of the Suez Canal to Blocking
Attack.”
My Lords concur in the views expressed by the Commander-in-chief therein.
I am, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES WALKER. w
Enclosure.
Copy of Letter from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to the Secretary,
Admiralty.
No. 1865/289. ILM.S. 11 Iron Duke," at Malta,
Sir, September 20, 1923.
IN reply to Admiralty letter M/P.D. 01869/23 of the 1 <th August, 1923, be pleased
to lay the following remarks before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
2. I have read with care the Naval Staff Paper on the “ Liability of the Suez Canal
to Blocking Attack” ; it is an exhaustive study of the possibilities of this occurrence,
and 1 have no remarks to offer on the technical difficulties involved.
3. The broad view of the case is summed up on page 8 of the Staff Memorandum.
However much the legal aspects of the matter may be argued, it is inconceivable that
Great Britain would not take the necessary steps to guard the Canal in the event of
strained relations with Japan. For this purpose the Navy must have unrestricted use
of the ports at either end and control the approaches to and traffic through the Suez
Canal. Similarly, the British army should be in effective occupation of the strategic
points in the Canal zone.
4. When final arrangements are made with the Egyptian Government as to the
extent of the British military responsibilities under the new regime, it is urged that it
should be made quite clear to the Government that Great Britain regards the inviola
bility of the Canal as an integral part of her policy, and at any threat to this she
reserves her right to take such steps as may be considered necessary to protect her
interests in that waterway.
5. An alternative policy is to raise the question in any future revision of the Suez
Canal Convention, and claim the right of protecting the Canal on the ground of our
paramount interests. But, in my opinion, such a policy is likely to arouse suspicion in
the minds of the other signatories of the convention, and it is preferable to let sleeping
dogs lie and act when it becomes necessary.
I am, &c.
(Signed) 0. de B. BROCK, Admiral,
Commander-in-chief.
* Printed as C.I.D. 438-B.
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