أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [ظ‎‎٢‎٠] (١٧٦/٤٠)

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4. The conclusion appears to be that the perpetuation of effective British control
over Palestine can only be secured by the retention in perpetuity by His Britannic
Majesty of the Mandate for that territory, coupled with a consistent refusal on the part
of His Majesty’s Government to instruct their representative on the Council to agree to
any proposed modification which would prejudice that control. This is a perfectly
feasible policy. On the other hand, it would be difficult for His Majesty’s Government
themselves to propose any modification in the Mandate which was clearly designed to
further British military interests, and it is unlikely that any such proposal, however
carefully disguised, would in fact be approved. We are therefore limited by the
terms of the present Mandate, and it remains only to consider to what extent these
justify the utilisation of Palestine as a place d’armes for British military forces.
5. It may be of interest to quote here the terms of Article 17 of the Palestine
Mandate, and to compare them with those of the corresponding Article 2 of the
approved Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon:—
Palestine Mandate.
“ Article 17.
“ The Administration of Palestine may organise
“ on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the
“ preservation of peace and order, and also for
“ the defence of the country, subject, however, to
“ the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not
" use them for purposes other than those above
“ specified save with the consent of the Mandatory.
“ Except for such purposes, no military, naval or
“ air forces shall be raised or maintained by the
“ Administration of Palestine.
“Nothing in this Article shall preclude the
“ Administration of Palestine from contributing
“ to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of
“ the Mandatory in Palestine.
“ The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times
“ to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine
“ for the movement of armed forces and the car-
“ riage of fuel and supplies.”
Syrian Mandate.
“ Article 2.
“ The Mandatory may maintain its troops in
“ the said territory for its defence. It shall
“ further be empowered, until the entry into force
“ of the organic law and the re-establishment of
“ public security, to organise such local militia as
“ may be necessary for the defence of the territory.
“ and to employ this militia for defence and also
“ for the maintenance of order. These local forces
“ may only be recruited from the inhabitants of
“ the said territory.
“ The said militia shall thereafter be under the
“ local authorities, subject to the control which
“ the Mandatory shall retain over these forces.
“ It shall not be used for purposes other than the
“ above specified save with the consent of the
“ Mandatory.
“ Nothing shall preclude Syria and the Lebanon
“ from contributing to the cost of the maintenance
“ of the forces of the Mandatory stationed in the
“ territory.
“ The Mandatory shall at all times possess the
“ right to make use of the ports, railways and
“ means of communication of Syria and the
“ Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all
“ materials, supplies and fuel.”
It will be noted that for some reason there is no provision in the Palestine Article
on the lines of the first sentence of the Syrian Article, which allows the Mandatory to
maintain his own troops in the territory for its defence, but it may be taken from the
last two sentences of the Article, which are practically identical with the last two
sentences of the Syrian Article, that no question would seriously be raised of our right
to maintain troops in Palestine for its defence.
But the utilisation of Palestine as a place d’armes either for the defence of the
Suez Canal or for general British military purposes in the Middle East is more likely
to be challenged, though there would presumably be less objection to hospitals,
sanatoria and hot weather stations being established in the cooler climate of Palestine
for British troops stationed in adjacent countries.
6. If, then, it is decided that the arguments advanced in the Foreign Office
Memorandum render the permanent retention in Egypt of the garrison required by
British military policy impossible, it appears preferable to pursue the suggestion that
effective British control should be acquired over the Sinai peninsula, including, if
possible, the Port Said-Suez railway. Palestine could be garrisoned to the extent
necessary for the defence of that territory, and might also be used as a hot-weather
station, but could not, consistently with the Mandate, be converted into a place d'armes
for British military requirements in Egypt or the Middle East generally.
Colonial Office, S.W.,
August 31, 1923.