أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [و‎‎١‎٩] (١٧٦/٣٧)

3
depends for its effectiveness on the assumption that the maintenance of the British
garrison in the capital is the cheapest form of insurance against the outbreak of disorder
necessitating armed British intervention. But the political difficulties inherent in such
a policv may render it a most costlv and embarrassing commitment, whereas, in
the absence of British troops in the interior, the outbreak of grave disorder would, as
in 1882, free the hands of His Majesty’s Government from the restrictions which the
political developments of the last few years have imposed.
12. In the opinion of the Foreign Office, therefore, the undoubted physical
advantages of Fgypt as a permanent 'place d'armes are discounted by the political draw
backs, and it would consequently be imprudent to count on the indefinite maintenance
of the present disposition of the garrison. A standing defence scheme for the Suez
Canal must take into account political as well as purely military considerations, and it
is therefore suggested that the basis for such a scheme should be sought in the
perpetuation of effective British control over the Soudan and Palestine and the
acquisition of such control over the Sinai peninsula, including, if possible, the Port
Said-Suez Bailway. pan passu with the progressive withdrawal of the present garrison
from the interior of Egypt.
Foreign Office, August 9, 1923.