أوراق مطبوعة عن الوضع السياسي والسياسة العسكرية في مصر [ظ‎‎١‎٨] (١٧٦/٣٦)

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revision after a relatively short period, and the apparent willingness of the War Office
to relinquish Kasr-el-Nil barracks might facilitate the negotiations, and would, at any
rate, furnish evidence to Egyptian opinion of the intention of His Majesty’s Govern
ment to honour their undertakings. If, on the other hand, the negotiations were to
end in complete failure, it is possible that Egypt might bring the question to the notice
of the League of Nations, a course which would he rendered still more probable if in
the meantime she had herself become a member of that body. In taking such action
the Egyptian Government could claim that they had done their best to settle the
matter amicably with His Majesty’s Government and had failed, owing to the latter
refusing to apply the general proposition which they had themselves laid down in the
case of the French occupation of the Ruhr.
6. As against this claim, His Majesty’s Government could only argue that the
question of the garrison was a purely Anglo-Egyptian one which must be decided in the
manner laid down in the British Declaration of the 28th February, 1922, and that, until
agreement was reached, the status quo must be maintained. It might also be possible
to invoke the British intimation (“ Egypt, No. 2, 1922.” Cmd. 1617) to all foreign
Powers following the withdrawal of the protectorate that His Majesty’s Government
would regard outside intervention in the affairs of Egypt as an unfriendly act. It is,
however, to be feared that before an impartial court the Egyptian claim would appear
to be the stronger one, and it would certainly be embarrassing for His Majesty’s
Government to refuse an offer of arbitration by the League or reference of the dispute
to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
7. The greatly enhanced importance of the Suez Canal as a factor in imperial
strategy is clearly brought out in a note by the naval staff already circulated to the
Sub-Committee on the Defence of British Ports Overseas. In that paper it is shown
how relatively easy it would be for the Japanese effectively to block the Canal for
several months by sinking a ship in any one of several suitable places immediately before
the outbreak of war.
8. The protection of the Canal against such an act of sabotage is admittedly
of vital importance to the safety of the Empire, but it is evident from paragraph 12 of
Lord Derby’s memorandum that this is not the only consideration which has led the
War Office to select Egypt as the most suitable place d’armes on the road to the East.
In support of the argument that it is necessary to maintain British troops in the
interior of Egypt, it is stated in paragraph 6 that “ our position in the Soudan ....
“ cannot be considered secure unless we are able to control Egypt.” The view held in
the Foreign Office has been the precise converse, viz., that as long as we control the
the Soudan and the Canal, Egypt is at our mercy.
9. Again, in paragraph 3 of the memorandum, reference is made to the conclusion
(Pal./lO) of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial
Defence in regard to the strategical importance of Palestine. That conclusion was
based upon memoranda by the Colonial Office, Air Staff, General Staff and Naval Staff.
There was a certain divergence in the views expressed, and a compromise was reached in
the conclusion that “ the Suez Canal can best be defended from the Sinai peninsula with
“ a force based on Egypt and with advance detachments at Rafeh and Akaba.” But, in
the view of the Colonial Office and Air Staff, “ Egypt as the base for a large expedi-
“ tionary force, as it was from 1914-18, is now unthinkable.’ In spite of this strong-
expression of opinion, which is shared by the Foreign Office, it is as a base for an
expeditionary force that the War Office apparently wish to regard Egypt.
10. It has been shown above that rigid insistence on the permanent occupation of
the interior of Egypt will sooner or later give rise to acute political difficulties with the
Egyptian Goveinment, whereas close and friendly relations, or, better still, a defensive
alliance with that Government would, ipso facto, simplify the problem of protecting the
Canal from sabotage. On the other hand, it is not suggested that the British garrison
should be withdrawn from the interior of Egypt except by degrees and in virtue of
agreements concluded from time to time with the Egyptian Government and approved
bv the Egyptian Parliament. In these circumstances it is recognised that adequate
provision ot a temporary nature must be made for the decent accommodation of the
troops which at present constitute the garrison. It is, however, politically important
that such additional accommodation should not be erected in the neighbourhood of Cairo
and Alexandria, as this would be interpreted as evidence that, in spite of the declaration
of the 28th February, 1922, His Majesty’s Government were still determined to render
Egyptian independence nugatory.
11. It must be remembered that the argument in favour ot the permanent
occupation of Cairo, developed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Lord Derby’s memorandum,