"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». المجلد ٤٣ الجزء II. (من ١٥ إلى ٢٨ فبراير ١٩١٨.)" [و‎‎٤‎٠] (٤٤٢/٨٤)

Telegram P. 5 No. 158-S., dated 16th February 1918. APPENDIX 339
(Received in War Section, 17th February 1918.) [Dy- No. 13035)
From—-The Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), Delhi,
To—The Secretary of State for India, London.
(Repeated to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran; and Sir P. Cox, Baghdad.)
According to our appreciation of situation there appears no present likeli
hood of Turco-German thrust into North-West Persia. Apart from military
considerations mentioned in Commander-in-Chief s telegram llo25, February
12th to Chief of the Imperial General Staff, it is unlikely for political reasons
that Germany, now posing as liberator of Persia, would undertake such an
advance unless to attack and eject troops sent by us into this area. Thus im
mediate danger reduces itself to enemy agents and acts of brigandage. Against
these Persian Cossacks whether under Russian or British officers should be
adequate [vide Marshall's telegram X.-6505, February 12th {Dy. No 11908), to
Chief of the Imperial General Staff]. Germans moreover in view of failure ol
their former missions will probably not attempt much in this direction,
particularly if a more friendly Persian Government and people is won for us by
liberal policy. If force is to be used it would have to be on scale sufficient
completely to overawe country ; and as Russian co-operation appears out of the
question it vould have to be supplied entirely by ourselves. It is only on
strongest political grounds that such a diversion could be justified. To us there
appear the strongest political objections. In default of serious provocation,
and it would be difficult to shew its existence—such a measure would finally
discredit ns with Persia and bring on us odium of whole Moslem world. It
would obviously make impossible existence of any real Persian Government and
in Afghanistan where our action against neutral Moslem State whose integrity
we have guaranteed, would undoubtedly be misrepresented and it would excite
liveliest suspicions. We trust that a measure which, apart from military objec
tions and transport difficulties, is open to such objections will not be sanctionea
merely for the sake of dealing with possible enemy intrigue, before giving a
fair trial to policy of conciliation, coupled with maintenance of existing
Persian forces, viz., South Persia Rifles and Persian Cossacks.
Necessity of early decision as to definite policy to be pursued is emphasised
by case of Sulaiman Mirza {vide General Officer Commanding, Force 6< DV’
telegram to Chief of the Imperial General Staff, X.-6549, February 16th
{Dy. No. 12628). Every day’s delay makes the policy of conciliation we strongly
advocate less practicable.
This is with reference to Mailing’s telegrams 99-F, and 103-P,, February
12th {Dy. Nos 12196 and 12205). '
Record copy to G S. (M, 0. 3).
Copy to M. S. C, A. G., Q. M. G., G. S. (M. O. 1).
Telegram P., No. X.-6564, dated ] 6th February 1918.
(Despatched 9-30 a,m, received 8-30 p.m., ]6th February 1918.)
p 10m —The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D," Baghdad,
To—The Chief of the General Staff, Delhi.
Your 12460- February 15th.
My X.-5874. Begins : Reference your 49090-Cipher-S. D.-2, dated Jan-
uary 1st.
Base—
1 D. D. 0. S.
1 D. A. D. 0. S. (Ordnance officer, 3rd class).
1 temporary Ordnance officer.
G H i D. o s.
1 A. D. O. S.
2 D. A. D. 0. S. (Ordnance officers, one 3rd and one 4th class).
L. of C.—
1 D. D. 0. S.
Advance Ordnance and ammunition depdts—
1 C. O. o.
1 Ordnance officer (3rd class),
1 I. 0. 0, (4th class).
APPENDIX 340
(By. No. 13010)