"مذكرات الحرب. مقر قيادة الجيش، الهند. [...] قوة المشاة الهندية «د». المجلد ٣٢. الجزء II. (من ١٦ إلى ٣١ مارس ١٩١٧)." [و‎‎٦‎٥] (٢٩٤/١٣٤)

Telegram P., No. I. A.-8071, dated 23rd March 1917. APPENDIX 295
(Despatched 3-5 p.m., received 1 a.m., 24th March 1917.) (Dy. No. 19599)
From—The General Officer Commanding, Egypt,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D.”
(Kepeated Commander-in-Chief in India, and Director, Military Intelligence, London.)
1 (44 ?)th regiment shown at Has-el-Ain by absolutely reliable informa
tion dated March 21st. This number was (repeated ?) when queried by
recipients. March 22nd is the date on which it was expected to have started
from there (?*) for Mosul. Orders
gyp s query. received by 31st Cavalry Eegiment to
proceed from Felujah to Samarra, bringing any ammunition and unallotted
troopers at Bimadieh with it.
Working copy to G. S. (M, O. 3).
Copy to M. S. C., G. S. (M. O. 1).
Telegram P., No. X.-1399, dated 2.3rd March 1917. APPENDIX 296
(Despatched 8-40 p.m,, 23rd March 1917 ; received 8-30 a.m., 24th March (Dy. No. 19644)
1917.)
From—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D,”
To—The Secretary, War Office, London.
(Repeated Chief of the General Staff, Delhi.)
Your 30586-Cipher-M. E-2 (Dy. No. 15667) of 8th March.
Am pushing on with conversion of Qurnah-Amarah to metre gauge and
hope to complete about April 20th. Until the floods subside completion of
Basrah-Qurnah railway not possible. On February 22nd detailed reports
regarding difficulties of extension beyond Amarah on right bank were posted to
you. But in view of altered situation (transport ?) navigation between Kut-el-
Amarah and Baghdad after flood season will become difficult and impossible
for larger steamers probably, whereas there are no particular difficulties of
navigation between Amarah and Kut-el-Amarah. Instead of railway from
Amarah to Kut-el-Amarah, have decided to lay down line from Kut-el-Amarah
to Baghdad and expect to be in a position to deliver material at Kut and make
a start with plate-laying by end of April. Thereafter I hope to carry on as fast
as material can be supplied from India. Forecast of demand in material and
personnel involved by policy now decided upon is being wired by Director
of Eailways to Eailway Board.
Working copy to Q. M. G„ G. S. (M. 0. 1).
Copy to M. S. C., M. B., G. S. (M. O. 3).
Telegram P., No. I. A.-3073, dated 23rd March 1917. APPENDIX 297
(Despatched 11-30 p.m., 23rd March 1917 ; received 8-30 a.m., 24th March (Dy. No. 19645)
1817.)
From—The General Officer Commanding, Egypt,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ I),’ , Basrah.
(Repeated to Director of Military Intelligence, London, and Commander-in Chief in India.)
It is suggested by an absolutely reliable source that in getting the whole
force to the left bank on 21st instant, delay was being experienced. Under
pretence of reconnoitring, a cavalry squadron was kept in the Edhaim district
preparatory to the crossing. Urgent demands were made for oil and German
foodstuffs from Deir Zor and Ana. Oil to be sent from Hit to Tekrit. It
is confirmed that at Samarra there is shortage of barley and coal. .
Working copy to G. S. (M. O. 3).
Copy to M. S. C., G. S. (M. O. 1).
Telegram P., No. X.-1402, dated 23rd March 1917. APPENDIX 298
(Despatched 9-55 p.m., received 10-30 a.m., 24th March 1917.) (By. No. 19671)
From—The General Officer Commanding, Force “T>,” Basrah,
To—The Secretary, War Office, London.
(Repeated Chief of the General Staff, Delhi.)
All the rolling stock of the Baghdad-Samarra line has been taken from
here by the Turks. At the beginning of the war 3 or 4 locomotives belonging