ملف ١٠٠٠\١٩١٨ الجزء ٤ "بلاد فارس: السياسة" [و‎‎١‎٨‎٩] (٣٧٥/٣٧٤)

From Viceroy, Foreign Department, 26th November 1918.
(Repeated to Teheran.)
(Received 27tli November, 8.30 p.m.)
P 5243 ] Secret. Persia. Cox’s telegrams 970,971, 974. While sympathising
with Cox’s desire for establishment of law and order in Persia and
recognising to the full his success in bringing order out of the chaos in
Mesopotamia, we must emphatically dissent from his proposed solution of
Persian problem, if indeed such solution be (? within] range of practical
politics.
1. Acceptance by us of mandate of the Peace Conference to run Persia
ife for a number of years would, unless coupled with a mandate from Persia
herself be a flagrant departure from our oft-repeated guarantee of Persia’s
integrity.
2. It would involve military [corrupt group] on an extended scale to be
successful. Our experience of South Persian Rifles shows futility of military
half measures.
3. The required troops would presumably have to be provided from
India, and would prove an unwarranted drain on India’s military resources.
4. The cost which would presumably fall on India, would be prohibitive
and unjustifiable so far as Indian interests are concerned, and would certainly
provoke strong protests here.
5. It would be difficult if not impossible to provide adequate (? civil)
staff.
6. The expedient could only further emasculate Persia and render our
eventual withdrawal the more impossible.
7. Principle that large Powers are called onto intervene in neighbouring
countries when administration is chaotic involves far-reaching consequences,
e.g., Japan and China. Even if we did not dissent from Cox’s proposal on
these general grounds, we should have (? felt) bound to oppose it at this
juncture, when our responsibilities and consequent financial and military
obligations show sign of increase in many different quarters of Asia.
Our view is that we should maintain our influence in Persia by regaining
Persian confidence by liberal policy and removal of causes of irritation ;
that we should continue some assistance in arms and money ; that Persian
Government should be provided with financial adviser, whether British,
American or other ; that for the rest we should give Persia a real chance
which she has not had for years past since Russian domination began, of
putting her house in order and administering her provinces herself through
Governor-Generals. From Cox’s 974 the Prime Minister already appears
anxious to make a start, and we have evidences that Governor-Generals of
Pars, Kerman and Khorasan are competent to establish (? reasonable) order,
if helped and not hampered. We must not except counsels of perfection in
this distressful country.