"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [و‎‎٤‎٠‎٤] (١٣٨٦/٨١٧)

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The advantages of this position are:—
“ (1) Its commanding military value.
“ (2) The control it gives us of the whole navigable waterway to the Gulf.
“ (3) The possession of the whole of the rich cultivated area from Kurna to the sea.
“ (4) The fact that it completely covers Persian Arabistan and safeguards it from
Turkish intrigues or incursions.
“ (5) The moral effect on the Arabs.
“ (6) The control of the telegraph up to this point and also of the passage of the
Euphrates.
“ When we have reached Kurna and fully established ourselves there it will be time
enougli to consider whether we should go further."
Lord Crewe, in telegraphing 1 his sanction for this move, expressly
stated that he was not disposed to
l^l^' e l e » ram dated 27th November authorise an advance to Baghdad as had
been suggested in certain quarters, and
limited our operations to Kurna. The main considerations which governed
his decision were the fact that our available military forces at that period
were only one Division, and that our limited resources in river shipping and
the difficulties of navigation at that season, practically precluded any further
advance for the time being.
10. The operations against Kurna were begun on the 3rd December and
culminated on the 9th December in the surrender of that town, together
with the late Vali of Basrah, 1,200 prisoners and nine guns. Our authority
was thus established over the whole of the rich riverain tract between
Kurna and the sea, and also over the whole waterway navigable by Gulf
steamers, Kurna being the limit of such navigation.
By Christmas 1914 events had taken a somewhat disquieting turn.
From information received it became obvious that the 'Turks intended if
possible to retrieve the situation in Mesopotamia, and by the end of
January it was evident that they were collecting forces, not only to attack
us at Kurna and Basra, but also to threaten the oil fields in the Bakhtiari
Hills, a movement which involved a Turkish invasion of Persian territory.
Consequently, on the 27th January Lord Crewe despatched a telegram to
the Viceroy authorising the immediate despatch of the 12th Brigade.
“As there are indications of increasing Turko-Arab menace both on ligris and on
Euphrates, also of a possible early attack on the pipe line near Ahwaz, whilst Turkish
reinforcements we know are being sent to Baghdad."
At the same time Lord Crewe approached the Foreign Office on the subject
of sending a force to the Karun Valley to protect the pipe line and thus
indirectly "safeguard the oil lields. The Foreign Office communicated with
Teheran and explained that “ His Majesty’s Government were compelled to
“ take measures for the defence of their interests and property in default of
“ any effective Persian force sufficient to guarantee those regions against
“ Turkish invasion.” The Persian Government tacitly acquiesced in the
proposed action.
11. At the end of January 1915 the general position was somewhat as
follows : —AtNasariyeh Turks and Arabs were collecting for an attack on Basra
by the desert route to Zobeir. In the Kurna direction the Turks were in
considerable force, but unlikely to attack owing to the strength of the Kurna
position. On the Karun side the menace was becoming formidable, the
Turks were approaching, Jehad was being widely preached and the Arab
tribesmen were ripe for an armed rising against the Sheikh of Muhammerah
and ourselves. At the time we had approximately a Brigade in a strong
defensive position at Kurna, and two Brigades at and around Basra, while a
fourth Brigade was being got ready for embarkation in India. British
subjects had been withdrawn from Ahwaz and the Comet and Shushan had
been sent up the Karun to give moral support to the \ ice-Consul and
our adherents at Ahwaz. This, however, did not satisfy the Secretary
of State as sufficient considering the importance of the pipe line, the
vital necessity of preventing the spread of Jehad into Persian Arabistan
and the urgency of asserting our military superiority at the head of the
Gulf. Accordingly on the 1st February he despatched a telegram to the
Viceroy emphasizing the dangers of the situation.
MS 266 B