"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [و‎‎٣‎٨‎٥] (١٣٨٦/٧٧٩)

9
that caution must be impressed. A telegram was therefore despatched
on the lj?tli July which ended as follows :—
!t is understood that you will sanction no further advance, it being impossible to give
further reinforcements for Persian Gulf, and that for the time being you will content
yourself with holding the pipe line and the Vilayet of Basra.”
The capture of Nasiriyeh, however, had a stimulating effect on the
authorities in Mesopotamia and India .—Uappctit vient en mcmgeant!
“ Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 27th July 1915.
[< We consider now that the occupation of Nasiriyeh has been effected that it is strategi- rvr ±. i
cally necessary to occupy Kut-el-Amara. The latter is only 4 miles outside the limit of the
vilayet of Basra. By it both the Tigris lower reaches, and, by way of the Shat-el-Hai, the
Euphrates, are commanded. The reinforcement of our position on either river will be facili
tated by its occupation. V e shall also be able to protect the oil fields effectively from attack-
from the direction- of the Tigris and the powerful Beni Lam tribe will be brought under
our control. Our.garrisons at Amara and Nasiriyeh could probably be reduced and economv of
our t#oops thus effected when once we occupy Kut-el-Amara securely.
fhis telegram did not allay our apprehensions, and further it was
obvious that if reinforcements should be necessary they would have to be-
drawn from Xasinyeti or from liasra and Ahwaz. The telegrams which
follow show the attitude of the India Office at this period and also how the
advance to Kut-el-Amara was eventually approved.
“ Telegram from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 30th July 1915.
“ Please inform me of proposed distribution of troops after capture of Kut-el-Amara, the
strategic importance of which is fully recognized. It is necessary we should be strong at
Kut, ns it seems impi-obable that, if we hold it in force, any further offensive wilf be
taken by enemy on the Euphrates line, but that he will concentrate on the line of the
T On the.,assumption that the Shatt-el-Hai is the Turkish line of retreat from
I.asiriyeh, are you of opinion that by holding Nasiriyeh, a very unhealthy outpost, any
advantage is gained ? Communications with it. especially on river falling, are difficult.
Has advisability of withdrawing from Nasiriyeli and concentrating on the Tigris been considered
by you ? ■. •
“ The retention for political reasons of Ahwaz and Bushire as outposts is necessary
but would not the location of the remainder of troops along the Tigris and at Basra be
advisable ? I shall be glad, before you decide, to know your views.”
The reply to the above describes the grounds on which General Nixon
and the Government of India decided on holding Nasiriyeh and advancing
on Kut. The Secretary of State accepted their conclusions.
“ Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 5th August 1915.
“The questions in your wire of 30th July have for months past been closely and constantly
considered. On receipt of your telegram we again asked for Nixon’s views.
“ The case is expressed so clearly in his reply that we reply to your telegram by repeating
it
Begins. The instructions given by me to General Gorringe are to all intents identical
with the views of the Secretary of State.
* * * * -i,.
I entirely favour concentration on line of Tigris, but in inspect to total evacuation of
Nasiriyeli suggested, I am of opinion that the place is too important to abandon. In order
to exercise control over the powerful Arab tribes surrounding it, and for the effective occupation
of this vilayet. Nasiriyeh as a centre of civil government is essential.
For these reasons incalculable political harm would be done by withdrawing. The
reappearance of Ajaimi with a few Turks would re-establish Turkish authority, and every
irilje would be out of control. Nasiriyeh, I am informed, is healthier than Kuma or Basra,
and the climate becomes quite good shortly. Communications to Nasiriyeh by land are not
good, but a railway would make an improvement.
* * * .
It should b
by the occupatior
rushing it.
borne in mind that the reduction ; of troops at Amar.v is-.{mly .i/Wde.wUJide
of Kut. The advance on Kut wllf-be •met! kh!. itbmJiuunh ;;«\ ,.f
“ ■ 1 have curefalh* considered, and already stated
necessity of guarding pipe line with troops.
my views on Ahwaz and supposed
" T would again repeat that I see no military reason, providing proper arrangements are
made Avith the tribesmen, for retaining troops on the line of the Kanin for a prolonged
period. If the oilfields are to be held against any possible combination of tribes, Aery strong
reinforcements would be necessary.’ Ends.