"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [ظ‎‎٢‎٣‎٥] (١٣٨٦/٤٧٦)

32
** هذه التواريخ تقريبية In iny judgment it will not be wise io go to Baghdad unless w c can jncrease Ihc b\ a
whole Division of Infantry and on e nr two na.va.lr y regiments , and. this we know is impracticable
i* nless the Indian troops are withdrawn from France.
“ The conclusion of the whole matter therefore is that wc cannot under present circum--
stances go to Baghdad without incurring unjustifiable risks. It must be remembered that
during the winter the Russians are not likely to be able to make any advance into Armenia',
and consequently the Turks can very well spare a division or two from the Armenian army
at this season to reinforce the Mesopotamian troops.
“ We do not know what may now be the strength of the Mesopotamian force, hut we have
been told of a Brigade which was recently at Kifri and is now retiring to Baghdad, and-
presumably there is a. Baghdad garrison apart from the force beaten at Kut-el-Amara, !■»»
probably, not counting Arabs, the Turks can still muster some 10,000 men at or near,
Baghdad. If we go to Baghdad and the enemy retir-es to Sarnarra, they may very possibly he
reinforced there by another 10,000 men or more from" Armenia, and yet another reinforcement
from Aleppo, 1 so i greatly doubt whether we can hold Baghdad for any length of time With
our present force.
“ We have practically no reserves to depend on rnd we must play a safe game and husband
our sorely strained military resources.
“ I have felt it my duty to place these considerati ms before the Secretary of State because
everything points to our hands being forced, unless we can arrest the present trend of events
by a prompt and imperative decision.
“ Kut-eBAmara is only about 120 miles by road from Baghdad, although by river it is 220-
miles, and General Nixon’s advance guard, in boats, lias already covered some 20 miles of that
distance. I see no indication of a halt, in the pursuit, though in the present state of the river
t also see no probability of being able to overtake the enemy. If we do not stop him, (General
Nixon will soon be in Baghdad regardless of orders, and we shall then he faced by the grave
alternative of either having to withdraw again or of making our occupation effective. Fither
course involves serious considerations, more especially in view of the gloomy situation in the
near East.”
On that same evening (the 4th October) the Secretary of State
telegraphed as follows to the Viceroy :—
“From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department, dated 4th October 1915.
“ 3071. I shall be glad to know what Nixon’s present intentions are, as if, owing to
navigation troubles, there is no probability of catching and smashing the retreating enemy
fhere is no object in continuing the pursuit. —
“The orders com eyed in my 1812 of 24th April, and 3002 of 3ft h August still hold good,
subject to course of events at Baghdad and elsewhere and to the recommendations you in a v
now make,
“ Please cable you” estimate of enemy’s present strength in Mesopotamia.”
The orders above referred to limited the operations to th) Basra Yilayaf,
vide pp. 24 and 30, 4\ut III.
About the same time a Memorandum dated Oth October was prepart'd
by the General Staff, War Office, which though submitted a few days later
may conveniently be entered here :—
“Extracts from Memorandum by the General Staff, War Office.
“ It is probably quite feasible for Sir J. Nixon's force to advance to and seize Baghdad.
The question is whether he would he able to remain there.
*• For reasons stated in paragraph 4 below it appears quite possible for the Turks to
assemble a very superior force, whose arrival would lead to active operations by the Arabs
against our long and difficult line of communications.
“ It seems to us that to attempt to hold Baghdad, except with a force very much larger than
Sir J. Nixon’s, and with proportionately increased river transport, would he to court disaster.
Even supposing that we were able to hold it in the face of any force the Turks could bring,
against it, it is doubtful if we should he able to maintain our supply service during the months,
when the Tigris is low.
“We have not been able to discover from maps or reports any position in the neigh bour-
kood of Baghdad which would enable us to hold the town or district against a superior enemv.
Whatever line we took up would leave it open to the enemy to operate against our Hank and
line of communications.
“ 3. We see no reason why the Turks should not he aide io concentrate a large force
against us if we are holding a position at Baghdad. In fact it seems easier for them to con
centrate against us there than it would he at Kut-el Amara. There are no doubt difficulties
in the way of transport and supply, but we think these could be overcome.
“4 The Turks knowing that our bauds are full and that we are withdrawing
troops from Gallipoli to the Balkans, can reduce their forces in Syria-—Palestine, Hedjaz and
Asyr—Djemil could probably move 20,000 troops in this way from Syria to Mesopotamia, and
“0,000 could easily he spared from the Gallipoli. The Russian inactivity in the Caucasus
makes it quite feasible for the Turks to spare 15,000 or 20,000 from that front, especially ii
the winter time.
“ It therefore will become possible for 00.000 Turks to be assembled from the three districts
mentioned above, and to he conveyed in the course of some weeks to Baghdad. The occupation
1 Mr. Marling has since reported in telegram No 37S, dated 4th October 1915, that Jamal Pasha is said to bo ,
leaving Syria for Baghdad with 6,000 men from the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.