"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [و‎‎٥‎٥] (١٣٨٦/١٠٩)

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SECRET.
JL
/
PiVcis of Correspondence* regarding tli(‘ Mesopotamian
Expedition—Its Genesis and Development.
This particular phase ot the Great War though naturally and rightly
regarded as a subsidiary issue, may have results either for good or evil, of
the most far reaching consequence, it is therefore desirable to place on
record the origin of the expedition, the causes which justified it, and the
successive steps which have marked its progress, more especially as our
recent reverses have been the signal for much ill-informed criticism of the
Government, both by individuals and the Press.
During the earlier phases of the campaign each succeeding victory was
greeted with applause, and was prematurely welcomed, not only in the Press
but also in many influential quarters/as stages on the road to Baghdad.
\\ ith equal omniscient emphasis both Press and the critics now condemn a
policy which they have hitherto applauded, sometimes in extravagant terms
as the one campaign which had been brilliantly successful throughout*
For these reasons it is here attempted to give as briefly as possible in
documentary form a connected account of the political history of the
Mesopotamian campaign without dwelling unduly on its military episodes.
'Fhe India Office is more especially concerned with the responsibility of
the Secretary of State for India, and consequently special prominence is
given to that aspect of the case.
Although no actual rupture
* No. 13 (1914).
with Turkey took place until the
bth November, it will be seen from the
White Paper* issued in that month
‘land from the very
that the Porte had shown signs of great hostility to I
outbreak of our war with Germ any. . 1 (1^’
The Military Secretary, India bilice, drew the attention of the Secrelary
of State to the lacts in relation to India by two Minutes of the 24th August
and the 20th September, laying stress on the dangers to our Persian Gulf
interests, consolidated with so much care and effort in the past, and on the a
menace, not only to the security of the North-Western Frontier, but to i
our tranquillity and prestige in India itself, which hostilities with Turkey
involved.
^ The Minute of the 20th September 1014 entitled “The Role of India in
a Turkish W ar is so germane to what followed, that it appears necessarv to
quote from it at some length.
“ All the omens point to war with Turkey within a few weeks or even daws. Such a ~
contingency need not alarm us unless the Turks succeed in drawing the Arabs to their side
In that case they will probably proclaim a Jehad and endeavour to i-aise Afghanistan and the *
Frontier tribes against us/which might be a serious danger to India and would most certainly
add enormously to our difficulties and responsibilities. This shows how important it is to us
to avert a Turko-Arab coalition.
u It is known that Turkey lias been intriguing right and left to win over the Arabs and it
is even said that Bin Saood, the leading Aral) chief, has been induced to join the Turks. If
this is true, we may expect serious trouble, both in Mesopotamia and in Egvpt.
“ 1 have discussed this aspect of the case with Major Shakespear, and he feels sure that Bin
Saood has not yet fully committed himself as his hatred of the Turks is too pronounced to
admit of an easy surrender to their blandishments. Moreover, he is convinced that we have
only to give some sure sign of our intention to support hiny and the Arabs generally against
the Turks bo turn the balance in our favour. How can we give such a sign V Mv solution of
the problem is that we must give the signal before war breaks out or it may be too late, and
that the best way of doing so. is to send a force from India to the Shatt-el-Arab at once.
“ M r e can easily do so at the present moment without arousing any suspicion. Troops and
ships are in readiness at Bombay. The Navy can convoy them to the month of the Gulf, and
the Expedition, if despatched under sealed orders, could arrive at the mouth of the Shatt-el-
Arab without a soul knowing anything about its despatch for this purpose.
“On arrival the troops can be landed on Persian soil at Muhammei-ah or at Abadan Island,
ostensibly to protect the oil installation, but in reality to notify to the Turks that we meant
business and to the Arabs that we were ready to support them. So startling and unexpected
a sign of our power to strike would at once determine the attitude of the Sheikhs of
Muhammerah and Koweit as well as of Bin Saood (and the support of the Arabs would
utterly destroy all prospect of Turkish success either in Mesopotamia or in Egvpt With the
Arabs on our side a Jehad is impossible, and our Indian Frontier is safe from attack
M.S. 128. /(
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