"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [ظ‎‎٥‎١] (١٣٨٦/١٠٢)

9
.i v • o,„l Pptcv Cox wlio m-ima facie are in the best position to judge of its
r' X ,U , • ^ivpptlv lu^an agitation in the Press or in commercial circles, it may even
bTurgeYand there is much force in the argument, that it is advisable on political grounds
on account of the world-wide prestige which the occupation of Baghdad would confei.
Cenahdv strong ai-uments can be advanced for its occupation, and the ease with winch the
operation can be carried out will be impressed on us with such cogency and insistence that
t h e -proposal will be difficult to resist. The very glamour attaching to so historic a city is m
A ' , i ic . vl fh extreme reluctance that I advocate a policj of caution,
wWch'wiUcertSy be m.popular, an.l perhaps difficult to justify in the minds of those who
are not intimate with the intricacies of the problem.
“ in mv iudo-nient it will not be wise to go to Baghdad unless ice can in creme the force by a
whole Division of Infantry and one or two Cavalry regiments, and this we know is impracticable
unless the Indian troops are withdrawn from France.
“The conclusion of the whole matter therefore is that we cannot nnderpresentcncum-
stances go to Baghdad without incurring unjustifiable risks. It must be remembered that
duriim the winter the Russians are not likely to be able to make any advance into Armenia
and consequent!v the Turks can very well spare a division or two from the Armenian army at
this season to reinforce the Mesopotamian troops.
*
« We have practically no reserves to depend on and we must play a safe game and husband
our sorely strained military resources.”
“ If we do not stop him, General Nixon will soon be in Baghdad regardless of orders, and
we shall then be faced by the grave alternative of either having to withdraw again or of
making our occupation' effective. Either course involves serious considerations, more
especially in view of the gloomy situation in the near East.