"أوراق متعلقة بلجنة بلاد الرافدين من غرفة السير إ. بارو" [و‎‎٤‎٠] (١٣٨٦/٧٩)

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When on 24th April our troops were still at and south of Kurna, tli£
Secretary of State in his telegram, iNo. 1812 of that date defined the policy
of Government, as follows :—
“ Nixon s demand (for a Cavalry Brigade) implies intention on his part of important
offensive movement. I presume he clearly understands that Government Avill not sanction at
tins moment any advance beyond present theatre of operations. We must confine ourselves
luring summer to defence of Basra Vilayat and oil interests in Arabistan. If, after smashing
■nOtny in Karun direction it is possible to advance to Amara with view to establishing an
outpost v inch will control tribesmen between there and Ivarun, and so contribute to security
of pipe-line there, 1 should be prepared to accept such a proposal, provided it is supported bv
you, but I deprecate any plan involving undue extension and possible demands for reinforce
ments. ^ Strategically, our present position is a sound one. and at present we cannot afford to
take risks by unduly extending it. We must play a safe game in Mesopotamia,”
lu his No. If. G582 of the 27th July, the Viceroy telegraphed:—-
■ • • The occupation of Kut*el-Amara is considered by us to be a strategic
necessity. . . . Once securely in possession we could probable reduce our garrison "at
Nasiuyeh Amara, and thus economise our troops. . . . W e request your sanction to
our authorising Nixon to eaptue Kut-el-Amara. . . .”
On the 30th July in his 1707, the Secretary of State called attention to
the previous orders.
The Viceroy replied on the 5th August, quoting at length General
Nixon’s views, urging the occupation of Kut-el-Amara. lie endorsed those
views and proposed to authorise the advance on Kut-el-Amara.
On the following day, Mr. Chamberlain in his 3002 of Gih August,
sanctioned the advance to Kut. The result was the brilliant actio*!] of
Kut-el-Amara and the complete rout of the Turks. By the 3rd October the
head of the pursuit had reached as far as Bagheila, and on that date
General Nixon telegraphed as follows :—-
1 consider I am strong enough to open road to Baghdad, and with this intention I propose
to concentrate at Aziziyeh. But this concentration must be partly by land. Families of
Germans and Turkish Officials are said to be leaving Baghdad for Aleppo. From militarv
point of view it is highly desirable to capture enemy’s steamers, which at this season cannot
.get tar up stream of Baghdad.
Thereupon the Secretary of State in his 3071 of 4th October replied as
follows :—
“ f l )e plad t° know what Nixon's present intentions are, as if, owing to navigation
^roubles, there is no probability of catching and smashing the retreating enemy, therehs no
object in continuing the pursuit. The orders conveyed in my Ibl^ of 24th Apj.il, and 3002 of
Oth August still hold good, subject to course of events at Baghdad and elsewhere, and to the
•recomtnendations you may now make. Please cable your estimate of enemy’s present strength
in Mesopotamia.” *
He also telegraphed privately as follows : —
^ My official telegram of to-day about Nixon’s plans. Your privat: letter of lOfh
'September seems to render it imperative to stop Nixon’s further advance. I shall he
grateful for early communication of your views.”
^ On the same day the Military Secretary submitted a Minute entitled
“ The Mesopotamian Question in its Military Aspect ” vide Armendix TV to
0.4.1). O—, 28 of October which was circulated to the Cabinet.
The following extracts show its tenour : —
“ The victory at Kut-el-Amara is of so complete a nature that the idea of pushino- on to
Baghdad will certainly be revived. Pressure will be brought on us, either directly by Sir
M.S. 65.
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