"دليل بلاد فارس، المجلد I ويشمل محافظات أستراباد، شاهرود-بوستان، خراسان، وسيستان" [ظ‎‎٣‎٠‎٥] (٧٢٢/٦١٧)

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development by means wholly unobjectionable, which would, at the satne
time, teach the Persians how much their best interests coincide with ours,
and would liberate them from the single dominating dread of Russia.
Suppose, for example, that Bushahr were made into a port. In the opinion
of those who should know best—English merchants resident in Bushahr
— the thing could be done for quite a moderate expenditure. The
Persian government has profited by the growth of the trade of Bushahr
in recent years, and would profit still more by an improvement which
would give a decided impulse to commerce. By proceeding gradually, we
might manage to effect a great improvement in each of the main routes
from the Persian Gulf to the interior of Persia,—the routes from Bandar
Abbas to Karman, from Lingah to Lar, from Bushahr to Shiraz ; and a
new route might be opened up for western Persia up the Kanin river, and
thence by the shortest road to Isfahan. There is no chance that the Persian
government will do any of these things within any predieable time. Pri
vate speculation will not risk European money m a country which cannot
give satisfactory guarantees. It seems a very bold suggestion that Indian
revenues should be expended in furthering public works in Persia. But
consider the treaty of Gandamak, which, “ being dead, yet speaketh ”
somewhat to the point in this matter. The clauses in that treaty, to which
nobody ever thought of taking objection, were those which provided for
the development of commercial routes through Afghanistan by the help
of the Indian government. Had the treaty stood, the money for these
works would never have been found by the Amir of Kabul ; the Indian
government must have paid for the roads and lines of telegraph. That
policy proved impracticable in Afghanistan, because Afghanistan is not
Persia. And are we not trying to cultivate friendly relations with the
Afghans even now, after all the bloodshed and hatred that has raised so
vast a barrier between us and them ? We would willingly subsidise the
Amir by larger and larger grants, in return for concessions on his part in
accordance with the universal comity of nations. Well—but while we are
doing, or would do, all this in that extremely unprofitable field, Afghani
stan, here is Persia, which counts as a flourishing and civilised power by
comparison, and which we are systematically neglecting. Is the danger
less ? The danger is far greater. The Afghan frontier is as yet far removed
from the farthest Russian outposts in the desert; but a chain of Russian
garrisons extends along the northern frontier of Persia, and draws provi
sions from Persians best provinces. Are we afraid of the, cost ? If state
loans to Persia never realised a penny to us in return, they would yet be
lar cheaper in the end than a war, costing twenty millions of money, to
say nothing of the misery and wickedness. It is easy to say that Persian
suspicion could not be overcome. The attempt has never been made.
The Shah is fully aware of the value of money:—let us try him with a
reasonable offer, and see whether he will not consent to some scheme for
developing the trade of his country under the direction of English officers
and with the help of English (or Indian) money. We keep on hoping to
induce the Amir of Kabul to grant us access to his dominions ; though every
Afghan has the most fatal reason to distrust and fear our power. The
Persians, on the contrary, bear us no grudge for the one brief conflict that
we have had with them : they are not afraid of our invading their country.
The cloud of danger to them is gathering in the north. Surely it is worth
while to do something, to make some sacrifice, for the sake of averting