"دليل بلاد فارس، المجلد I ويشمل محافظات أستراباد، شاهرود-بوستان، خراسان، وسيستان" [و‎‎٣‎٠‎٣] (٧٢٢/٦١٢)

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of protracted hostilities. At first, the Shah seemed inclined to accept the
invitation; but his minister, Mirza Agha Khan, suggested that the com
bined forces of. (Treat Britain, France, and Turkey were stronger than
th 086 . of Russia, and that it would be more prudent to join the allies
especially as a _ declaration of war against Russia might enable Persia to
recover the provinces which had been conquered by General Zizianoff^ and
ceded under the treaty of Gulistan, and to escape from the crushing conditions
imposed by the treaty of Turkmanchai. The Shah adopted the views
ofc his minister; and prince Dolgorouky was so enraged at this change
ot policy, which threw Persia into the arms of the allies at the moment
when her cordial support was a matter of grave moment to the Czar that
he warmly remonstrated with Mirza Agha Khan, and in his passion he
nourished ins^ cane and chanced to strike the prime minister on the le 0,
Mirza Agha Khan immediately took the cane and threw it to the other
end of the room, and requested the Russian representative to withdraw.
Soon afterwards prince Dolgorouky was recalled by his own government • and
in consequence of this recall, the pretensions of Persia in dealing'with
foreign ministers rapidly rose to that height of arrogance and insolence
which ultimately led to the withdrawal of the British mission.
The change of policy on the part of the Shah was not followed by the
expected results. Proposals were, indeed, afloat for carrying on the war
from the Asiatic side by land and sea—that is, by invading the Caucasian
provinces and launching war-steamers on the Caspian; and it is probable
that the Shah looked forward to large subsidies from the allies, as well as
to relief from treaty obligations. But the offers of Persia to join the allies
were not accepted. It was felt that the Persian alliance would only en
large the sphere of complications; for, in the event of the war in Europe
being brought to a conclusion, and Russian aggression checked on the
Danube, neither Great Britain nor France would be in a position to protect
Persia from the vengeance of Russia. Under such circumstances the
British minister advised the Shah to remain neutral. This course how
ever, did not at all accord with the inflated ideas of the Shah, who longed
to take a part in the great struggle.
At this juncture a correspondence arose respecting the employment of a
man named Hashim Khan by the British mission. This man had been
appointed Persian secretary to the mission. From some unknown cause the
Persian minister, Mirza Agha Khan, had entertained a violent dislike to
Hashim Khan, and was anxious that he should not remain in Tihran. The
minister urged that Hashim Khan had formerly been employed by the
Shah, and had never received a formal discharge; and he suggested that the
man should be sent from the post of Persian secretary at Tihran to fill the
post of British agent at Shiraz. Mr. Murray, the British representative,
conceded this point, as it was obviously inexpedient to employ a man, as
Persian secretary to the mission, who was personally obnoxious to the Persian
minister. Then Mirza Agha Khan unexpectedly announced that the Persian
government would not permit Hashim Khan to be employed by the British
mission at any place or in any capacity. To this arrogant dictation Mr. Mur
ray could scarcely be expected to yield, especially as he had ascertained that it
was not customary for the ShalPs servants to receive a written discharge
on quitting the royal service, and Mirza Agha Khan admitted that
Hashim Khan had been told to go where he pleased. Accordingly, Mr.
Murray declined to submit to the interference; and Mirza Agha Khan