"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [و‎‎٨‎١] (٢٥٦/١٦٤)

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rid Kermanshah they would hope to throw all Persia into disorder, and paralyse the Persian
Governments action by destruction of telegraph lines, and trust to a chapter of accidents to
involve her in war with us. It has also occurred to me that they might be contemplating an
attack on oil-fields or threatening our position at Basrah. At least one party of Germans has
left Ispahan for unknown destination by southern road, and they may be trying to rouse the
tribes, dhese speculations may seem far fetched, but 1 can offer no better guess at the objects
of German preparations at Ispahan.
No. 168.
Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated oth August 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Your telegram of the 30th ultimo. These questions have been under close and constant
consideration for months past, and Nixon’s views, originally called for on 19th June, and
furnished in his despatch of 24th June, have again been asked for on your above-mentioned
telegram.
His reply puts the case so clearly that we repeat it as our answer to your telegram
“ The views expressed b} r the Secretary of State are practically identical with those I
submitted in my despatch, dated 24th June, and with instructions 1 have given to General
Gorringe.
‘•In my despatch I emphasised the advantage of holding Kut-el-Amarah in force and the
unlikelihood of Nasiriyah being then threatened by Euphrates line, and the consequent
possibilit}' of reducing the strength of the Nasiriyah garrison.
“ With regard to the suggested total evacuation on the Nasiriyah, I am all in favour of
concentrating on the Tigris lin ?; but I consider that Nasiriyah is too important a place to
abandon altogether, as it must be a centre of civil government to control the powerful Arab
tribes by which it is surrounded, and effectually to occupy this vilayet.
“ A withdrawal from Nasiriyah would do incalculable harm politically on this account;
Ajaimi would reappear with a few Turks to re-establish Turkish authority, and all tribes
would get out of hand.
“ According to information at my disposal, Nasiriyah is less unhealthy than Basra or
Kurna, and in a short time the climate will be quite good. The land communications of
Nasiriyah are bad, but they could be improved by a railway. On this point I hope to address
you very shortly, the matter having been under investigation for many weeks.
“The water communications of Nasiriyah are difficult during the present low-water season,
but now that we are established in Nasiriyah and the enemy have been driven off, these
difficulties are by no means insuperable, and plentiful supplies are obtainable locally in this
district, while country boats of our contractors pass through the Hammar Lake freely.
“When the 18th Brigade returns from the Nasiriyah Force it will join its division at
Amarah, and the 6 th Division will then have two brigades at Amarah and another Brigade
at Ali-al-Gharbi and its communications.
“ When Nasiriyah can be reduced to strength proposed, viz., one brigade, the reserve at
Basra will be one brigade, and the 3rd Brigade, 12th Division, will be on communications
from Basra to Qalat Salih inclusive. .
“ If Kut is occupied I propose to leave four battalions at Amarah and, after placing
detachments at two or three posts, quarter two infantry brigades in Kut.
“ I would point out that it is only by occupying Kut that the reduction of troops at
Amarah is possible. I have no intention of making any dash on Kut; the advance will be
made methodically. . ,
“ At present General Delamain’s column has cleared the river up to Ali-al-Gharbi, but
has orders not to proceed beyond. , . . , r
“4s regards Ahwaz and the supposed necessity to guard the pipe-line with troops, I
have carefully considered the question and have given my views at some length
“ But the Anglo-Persian Oil Company will not arrange for a subsidy while the Indian
Government is ordered to keep troops at Ahwaz for ever, and it is not easy to withdraw
troops because the Anglo-Persian Oil Company will not give subsidy, and this creates
deadlock^his connection l would reiterate that, if suitable arrangements j.be made with
tribesmen, T see no military reason for prolonged retention of troops on the Karim line unless
host ilif v is to be expected on the part of the Persian Government, in which easel should
requi^Very strong rekforeements if it i, required to hold the oil fields against any poss.ble
combination of Bakhtiaris and other tribes.
We concur in Nixon’s views and propose to authorise him to advance on Kut when he is
rC ‘ W So far as we are aware, Nixon knows nothing about the proposal to reinforce him
v .. .iKrwi+b the ‘^th Brigade, and has always believed his present force capable of
effecting the occupation of Kut "so long as he received drafts to mi up his British battalions,
and he was not required to disseminate troops along the pipe line. We concur in his views.
No. 169.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 6th August 1915.
(Telegraphic.) . t | concur in course of action proposed by Nixon and
Yo “- t , < AT m " , , 'lets C think fit to modify it in view of Marling’, telegram of
recommended b) } 0 i nbiective of Ispahan gathering. What is strength and
3rd August and Ins ^ume that the/are sufficient with local arrange-
distribution of troops on Karun nne . j j
ments at oil-fields for defence against raiders.
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