"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [ظ‎‎٦‎٥] (٢٥٦/١٣٣)

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within six miles of the shore are closed to warships, as they are territorial waters. Any
men-of-war disregarding this prohibition will be fired upon by the guns at Fao. These
regulations will be enforced from to-morrow evening, Wednesday', 7th October. They are
somewhat obscure, but they mean that H.M.S. Espirgle in the Karun and H.M.S. Dalhousie
at Abadan will be interned, unless they leave before the time fixed. No other British
man-of-war is this side of Fao. H.M.S. Lawrence is in the Shatt-el-Arab to the best of my'
belief. His Majesty’s consul at Mohammerah has been informed of the above.”
No, 14,
Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet, dated 7th October 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
British warships in the Shatt-el-Arab.
H.M. Ships Espiegle, Odin, and Dalhousie are not in Turkish waters. There can be no
question of their being ordered out of waters which are not Turkish nor of their being
interned by the Turkish Government. According to generally accepted principles of
international law, Turkish territorial waters extend to 3 miles out to sea from the coast.
Two of His Majesty’s ships are being instructed to keep outside the 3-mile limit, while the
remaining ship is being told to remain at Mohammerah, which does not belong to Turkey.
Our long established right to pass freely up and down Shatt-el-Arab at all times is not in
question, and it must be recognised that we fully reserve that right.
No. 15.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 8th October 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
Your telegram of 7th October. For the present it is not necessary to decide about Abadan,
and I am most anxious to avoid disturbing Indian Muhammadans ; but it is necessary to
reassure Arabs, who will be agitated by reports that Turks will spread of our retirement at
their dictation from Shatt-el-Arab. It is, therefore, important that an immediate demon
stration should be made. You apparently incline to Bassidu as a suitable rendezvous but for
scarcity of water. On the other hand, Bahrein lias great political advantages if difficulties of
landing can be met. Probably water difficulty at Bassidu can be overcome by distillation.
Shall be glad if you will send your views at once. Meanwhile, all preparations should
continue.
No. 16.
Chief of the General Staff, India, to Colonel W. S. Delamain, C.D., D.S.O.
dated 8th October 1914.
1 have the honour to send you herewith one sealed envelope containing :—
(a) Plan of operations for the protection of British interests at the head of the
Persian Gulf.
(b) Plan of operations for the support of Mohammerah.
(c) Plan of operations in Turkish Mesopotamia.
(d) Copies, in sealed envelope marked “A,” of the official correspondence which has
passed between the Government of India and the Secretary of State in regard
to the organisation, despatch and employment of Force “ D.”
2 . You will at once place yourself in communication with His Excellency the Naval
Commander-in-Chief and arrange a meeting as soon as possible after you have digested your
orders.
3. Please report by telegraph that you have received and understood your instructions.
Annex.
Orders for Colonel W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding Force “ DC
1 . Under instructions from His Majesty’s Government and Expeditionary Force consisting
of:—
Force Headquarters,
16th Infantry Brigade,
Nos. 23 and 30 Indian Mountain Batteries,
One Company Sappers and Miners,
One “ Combined ” Field Ambulance,
Supply Establishment,
with their transport will be detached from the convoy which leaves Bombay and Karachi on
15th October and will proceed under naval convoy up the Persian Gulf.
2 . You are appointed to command the Force which is known as Indian Expeditionary
Force “ D.” '
3. It will be necessary for you to concert in close consultation with the senior Naval
Officer your plan for disembarking and carrying out the role assigned you. It will, therefore
be advisable, if the senior Naval Officer is agreeable, that you and some of your Staff should
travel in the same ship with him.