"بلاد الرافدين. اللجنة" [و‎‎٣‎٠] (٢٥٦/٦٢)

on Bagdad for offenaive action against Basra. The situation
is now complicated by the diversion of troops to Ahwaz. So far
as protection of pipe-line is concerned, it is impossible to
take offensive action with our small force, and no
reinforcements we can send from India would suffice either for
this or to render position at Basra safe. We regard it as
essential that Basra should receive at least another complete
division and this we cannot provide. If therefore position in
‘‘esopotamia is to be made secure this must be done by sending
troops from elsewhere than India itself. We are aware of
strong objections of War Office to reducing the forces either
i n Sgypt or Sast Africa at present time, but having regard to
fact that a disaster in J esopotamia must inevitably bring into
the field against us both Persia and Afghanistan with the
Frontier tribes, and may seriously affect our Bussulraan
population and Mussulman troops, we consider that this danger
justifies our pressing for a reconsideration of attitude of
War Office. We also feel that India has a first claim on her
own troops when they are required to avert a danger which is
threatening her security. We therefore urge most strongly that
a complete division, or its equivalent, of Indian troops
should be at once returned to us, whether these are drawn from
gypt or Sast Africa. We entirely agree that prompt action
is most necessary. Situation at Aden is also unsatisfactory.
Ve are not strong enough there to do more than protect
settlement itself and we cannot send any troops to help tribes
who are nominally under our protection to defend themselves
against the Turks, who have invaded the Protectorate.