"كتاب أزرق. برقيات أُعيد صياغتها" [و‎‎١‎٧] (١٨٩/٣٣)

17}
4 .
I also consider that the heat position from which t 0 do >his
is Bagdad*
Ik>* 190*
Oct 9th* 19X5* From Viceroy to Secry of State for India.
1 eference to Blaton'a telegram of 8 th inst and yonr’s of same
date* Glad to hear of Cabinet*s decision* Hawing consulted
Coiranander-ln-Chief I consider that Hlxon ean best form esn
opinion as to the number Of troops he requires, so we under-
-stand that when he speaks of a division, he means a complete
division with Its divisional cavalry and guns end proper
proportion of British troops. 7 le asks for a regiment of cavalrJJ
in addition to this. AlthCugh we are ready to accept hie
opinion, we also think that , as India cannot supply the draft$
to ensure the British units now with him being maintained up
to full strength, it will be necessary for these to be sent
from home* ?he Indian units will be kept up to strength by us
Further we are of opinion that the reinforcements should get
to Bagdad not later than one month after it has been taken,
for we calculate that this is the time that must elapse before
the Turks can concentrate in sufficient strength to attempt
to retake it*
i^O* ECO*
Oct Elst* 1916. From Viceroy to Secry of State for India*
While agreeing entirely with Els Majesty's Government regar-
-ding strategical and political advantages following from
capture and occupation fo Bagdad, which the contents of
Marling*s telegram of Oct 16th emphasise, The Govt £6 India
look on the security if India and its frontiers as their first
pre-occupation and it is not possliule for us to send to
Mesopotamia From India a further force of the etfingth of a
division*
Having consulted the Commander In Chief, my opinion is
that 3 alternatives present themselves:—
(1). The capture of Bagdad and its occupation*
Provide*! that we receive a guarantee that a complete divisior.
of troops will arrive in Mesopotamia within 2 months from
this date, this will present no difficulty at all* And this