"ملفات 61/12 و 61/16 (D 80) معاهدة بين بان سعود والحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎١‎٧‎٢] (٤٠٨/٣٥٠)

be deceiving both parties if he consented. If the King decided that he could not
sign the treaty Sir G. Clayton hoped that he would give something in writing to
that effect in order that he might be in a position to show his Government why it had
been impossible to conclude a treaty.
Sir G. Clayton then took his leave, saying that he would now await the final
word from His Majesty.
During the course of the evening the King s advisers had another long
conference with Mr. Antonius, from which it eventually emerged that there was a
certain degree of misunderstanding. It became evident that Ibn Saud's objection
to article 6 was based on the fact that he was determined to sign nothing which might
be interpreted as an admission of any form of capitulatory system; the attitude
which he had taken up hitherto, and was determined to continue, was one of ignoring
the Capitulations altogether and refusing to recognise their existence. In his
endeavour to maintain this attitude, however, he had got himself into the position of
insisting on their actual abolition and was now holding firmly to his point. It was
eventually agreed by the sub-committee that the removal of article 6 and the inclusion
of a supplementary sentence in article 5 might solve the difficulty, and a meeting with
the King was arranged for the next day.
$th Meetiny.
At the ninth meeting, held at the King's house at 8-30 a.m . on the 20th May, the
suggestions put forward by the sub-committee were discussed between His Majesty
and Sir Gilbert Clayton, and final agreement was reached.
It was then agreed that all points had now been settled, that the text of the
treaty in English and Arabic should be put in hand immediately and that the
treaty should be signed on the evening of the same day.
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