"ملفات 61/12 و 61/16 (D 80) معاهدة بين بان سعود والحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎١‎٦‎٦] (٤٠٨/٣٣٩)

He had absolute trust in Great Britain and was confident of receiving
fair treatment from His Majesty's Government as long as they held the
mandates for Iraq and Transjordan, but he was impelled to draw
attention to the facts of the situation and to warn them against influences
which were incurably hostile to himself and would never cease to be
exerted against him.
3. The King then entered into further detail in regard to the particular case
of the tribunals for the settlement of claims on account of raids, with special reference
to Transjordan, where he said that progress seemed to be impossible on the present
lines. He said that, as regards past raids, he would be willing to accept the award
of an arbiter, provided that a selected British officer was appointed, and he urged
that this method of settling this vexed question be adopted in order to put an end to
the friction and ill-feeling engendered by the present dilatory procedure. To
facilitate speedy settlement in the future, he suggested the appointment of a British
officer, experienced in Arab habits and customs, whose duty it would be to keep a
constant watch over tribal affairs, and who would be the recipient of all details and
information regarding raids as and when they took place. The tribunals would then
have the advantage of the advice of an impartial authority who would be in a position
to give them full and carefully sifted information.
4. In conclusion, the King urged that the treaty should be implemented by real
co-operation on a definite plan, and begged that His Majesty's Government would
keep him informed as to the lines on which their policy was designed so that he might
conform effectivelv and with knowledge of what was required.
He felt also that clear evidence that the treaty was a really live instrument and
meant sincere co-operation could only have a good effect on the general situation.
I promised the King that I would convey his views to His Majesty's Govern
ment, and I restricted my own remarks to a few general observations.
I assured him of my belief that His Majesty s Government would certainly wish
to cement the good relations now established by co-operation in all matters in wdiich
the interests of the two countries were concerned.
With reference to France and Italy, I emphasised the close and friendly relations
which existed between Great Britain and those two countries; they had been our
allies in the war, and, although minor points of difference mi^ht arise from time to
time, it was not to be thought that they would adopt a policy designed to injure
British interests. In this connection, I informed the King of the conversations which
I had carried out in Rome with the Italian authorities, and gave him a general idea
of their purport.
As regards Transjordan and Iraq, I endeavoured to reassure the King,
explaining that, whatever may have been his relations with the Hashimite Princes in
the past, he need have no fear of personal enmities being permitted to influence
Government policy so long as Great Britain was responsible as mandatory Power.
With regard to the various detailed proposals put forward by Ibn Saud, I said
that I could give no immediate opinion or reply, as the questions raised would require
consideration by His Majesty's Government in consultation with the local
Governments concerned.
I have, &c.
GILBERT CLAYTON.